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LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING  
IN PROPERTY LAW* 
ERIC R. CLAEYS** 
This Article presents a natural rights justification for property 
rights in a theory called “productive labor theory.” Productive 
labor theory sets forth a Lockean, labor-based case for property. 
It links property to human interests in flourishing—specifically in 
interests in using ownable resources to produce constituent 
elements of survival or rational improvement. On this 
foundation, “labor” means intelligent and purposeful activity 
producing goods that contribute to survival or rational 
improvement. 
This Article presents productive labor theory as an alternative to 
the two families of normative theories that currently loom large 
in contemporary property scholarship—economic theories of 
exclusion and progressive theories. Each of these theory-families 
unsettles property in an important respect; productive labor 
theory shores up each of the foundations unsettled by exclusion 
and progressive theories. Like progressive theories, productive 
labor theory links property on a satisfying moral foundation, 
namely human flourishing. Unlike progressive theories, 
productive labor theory does not denigrate or undermine the role 
that exclusive control plays in property. Like leading economic 
theories, productive labor theory justifies strong rights of 
exclusive control and possession. Yet it avoids standard 
criticisms about normative foundations of law and economic 
analysis, and it identifies moral boundaries within which 
efficiency analyses might be normatively defensible. 
The Article illustrates productive labor theory using the prima 
facie case for trespass to land; the common law privilege for 
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necessity and the defense for adverse possession; Allemansrätt 
and statutory rights to roam; state and local landmark schemes, 
as exemplified in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York; and regulatory schemes authorizing the use of 
eminent domain to condemn and reassign private land for 
commercial redevelopment, as exemplified in Kelo v. City of 
New London. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To many scholars, property seems counterintuitive. In his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone 
famously described property as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”1 Although Blackstone was almost surely indulging in 
rhetorical excess,2 it is no accident that his description has become a 
sound bite in recent scholarship. The most familiar property rights 
confer on owners powers to exclude others from their possessions. 
Property confers such an exclusive power even when non-owners 
really need to use the object of property and will not damage it. 
“Sole	.	.	.	dominion” captures that normative structure; “despotic” 
captures how ominous and problematic that structure seems to many 
scholars.3 
That impression makes property rights hard to justify. An 
adequate theory needs to explain why property rights might confer 
broad authority on owners, and yet such breadth seems indefensible. 
 
 1. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 2. For a collection of ten sources acknowledging as much, see David B. Schorr, How 
Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 105 n.6 (2009). 
 3. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2. 
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The tensions created by these demands may be seen in the two main 
families of contemporary property theories. 
Consider the first family of theories, “exclusion theories.” 
Exclusion theories justify property rights as Blackstonian rights to 
exclude on various economic grounds: incentivizing investment and 
improvement, protecting subjective owner value, and minimizing 
third parties’ information costs in dealing with resources.4 Although 
these accounts capture property’s exclusive character, they are 
nagged by philosophical doubts. If exclusive property creates wealth, 
why does wealth creation justify excluding non-owners from a 
resource they desperately need?5 Questions like these have not yet 
been addressed satisfactorily in property scholarship. 
The second prominent theory-family covers self-styled 
“progressive” property theories. Progressive property theories resist 
giving economic analysis pride of place in property theory—especially 
because of the concern just mentioned, the gap between economic 
efficiency and philosophical legitimacy. Progressive theories portray 
property as being justified not by efficiency but by moral interests in 
well-being or flourishing. Property is messy and context-dependent, 
such theories maintain, because it balances “plural and 
incommensurable” interests.6 Although these theories avoid the 
problems from which exclusion theories suffer, they make it difficult 
to justify exclusive property. When property is cast as a right to use a 
resource consistent with a range of relevant and plural values, non-
owners may claim that they need to use owners’ resources and that 
owners have no rights to privilege their own intended uses over the 
non-owners’ incommensurable uses. When a judge arbitrates such 
claims, property ceases to seem a right; it seems instead a privilege to 
use an ownable resource as the judge finds valuable for the entire 
community. 
Taken together, exclusion and progressive theories seem to leave 
property on uneasy foundations. This Article aims to provide a more 
 
 4. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 358 (1967); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1352–53 
(1993); Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096–103 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001); Carol M. 
Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2182–85 (1997). 
 5. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in 
NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1982). 
 6. Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743, 743 (2009). 
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solid foundation. To do so, this Article steps outside these current 
debates and presents them from a different perspective—that of John 
Locke. There are two reasons for focusing on Locke here. First, 
Locke is a fine subject for an article in the North Carolina Law 
Review because Locke was involved in preparing The Fundamental 
Constitutions of Carolina of 1669.7 Second, and more generally, 
Locke’s chapter “Of Property” in his Second Treatise of Government 
deserves pride of place in the western legal tradition for making 
property a dominant category in legal and political thought.8 Legal 
historians acknowledge that it “is difficult to overstate the impact of 
the Lockean concept of property” on American property law.9 
Property scholars also recognize that Locke “still today [supplies] the 
point of departure for most philosophical discussions of property.”10 
Of course, as Locke’s theory of property continues to resonate, it 
also continues to attract considerable resistance. In many quarters, 
Locke’s theory seems “fraught with difficulties,”11 or it “appears in 
several versions, most of them deficient in one respect or another.”12 
Yet now may be a good time to explore whether these perceptions 
are accurate. Outside the legal academy over the last generation, 
scholars have begun to rehabilitate labor theory. The key insight from 
this philosophical work is that “labor” is most defensible when it 
refers to activity in pursuit of a low, solid, and sociable form of 
human flourishing—“rational (or purposeful), value-creating 
activity	.	.	.	directed toward the preservation or comfort of our 
being.”13 This Article refers to flourishing-based labor theory as 
“productive labor theory.” Productive labor theory is just now gaining 
recognition in contemporary legal scholarship.14 Since progressive 
 
 7. See JOHN LOCKE, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, in LOCKE: 
POLITICAL ESSAYS 160, 160–61 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) (1669). 
 8. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§	II.25–.52, at 285–302 
(Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1698). 
 9. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008). 
 10. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
459, 497 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 11. Hanoch Dagan, The Public Dimension of Private Property, 24 KING’S L.J. 260, 260 
(2013). 
 12. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (8th ed. 2014). 
 13. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS 
TO HUME 151 (1991). 
 14. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO PROPERTY THEORY 35–51 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Productive Use in Acquisition, 
Accession, and Labour Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 
13, 13–46 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013). For an earlier work anticipating 
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theories of property have raised deep questions about the link 
between property and flourishing, that political philosophy work is 
extremely relevant to the most urgent questions in legal property 
scholarship. 
To explain why, this Article makes three specific claims. First, 
this Article shows how productive labor theory conceives of and 
justifies a property right. Productive labor theory justifies property in 
relation to land and tangible personal articles as a presumptive right 
of exclusive possession, control, and enjoyment.15 Many scholars 
believe that a rights-based theory of property must mandate a right to 
exclude non-owners under any circumstances and with no 
qualifications.16 Productive labor theory works more subtly and 
indirectly. It permits, justifies, and encourages exclusive rights when 
such rights seem practically likely to facilitate concurrent labor by 
different citizens for different goals.17 Productive labor theory thus 
justifies exceptions to exclusive property—when the link between 
labor and exclusive control seems very weak, or when the needs of 
non-owners seem particularly strong. The two-tiered normative 
structure that emerges resembles Henry Smith’s two-tiered portrait of 
exclusion and governance.18 Exclusive control supplies the working 
template for property in simple resources; property law then 
incorporates various use- and need-based “governance” limitations 
when proprietors forfeit their rights to labor or when non-owners 
have particularly strong claims to use resources. This Article 
illustrates with basic doctrines associated with ownership of land—
trespass, necessity, adverse possession, and various common law and 
statutory easements limiting exclusive possession. 
This two-tiered rights structure addresses the main problems 
from which exclusion and progressive property theories suffer. This 
Article’s second claim takes up the contrast between productive labor 
theory and progressive property: the former anticipates and avoids 
the downsides already noted in the latter. Like progressive property 
theories, productive labor theory grounds property in moral interests 
in flourishing. As admirable as flourishing is in theory, however, it 
provides a troublesome grounding in practice. When property is 
 
this possibility, see also Carol M. Rose, “Enough and as Good” of What?, 81 NW. U. L. 
REV. 417, 423–33 (1987). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
 16. See infra Section I.C. 
 17. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 18. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S453–55 (2002). 
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linked to flourishing, that linkage makes it easy to weaken property 
theoretically, by reducing it to a right to use one’s property in the 
manner that public authorities decree will help everyone flourish. 
That theoretical possibility provides a powerful temptation in 
practice, because special interests and idealistic partisans may be 
interested in asserting public control over the use of property. 
Although these dangers cannot totally be avoided in legal practice, 
productive labor theory anticipates and avoids them more effectively 
than progressive theories do. To illustrate this claim, this Article 
discusses European statutory easements of passage or “rights to 
roam”; historic preservation or “landmarking” laws associated with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark regulatory takings case, Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York;19 and controversies 
over eminent domain and redevelopment, associated most recently 
with the Court’s landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London.20 
This Article’s third claim contrasts productive labor theory with 
exclusion theories. Productive labor theory anticipates the 
philosophical criticisms from which exclusion theories suffer and 
supplies answers to them. Exclusive property is philosophically 
defensible if, and to the extent that, it helps citizens satisfy their 
labor-based moral rights more effectively than simpler systems. In 
practice, exclusive property satisfies these expectations if it affords 
more people security to use their own resources than an open-access 
system would, if it encourages citizens to produce more useful goods, 
and if these goods circulate widely through commerce. Not only does 
that justification make exclusive property more defensible, but it also 
helps clarify the place of economic analysis of property. Exclusive 
property can be efficient—as long as people may clearly bargain and 
transact with money and property only within the parameters in 
which free, equal, and well-socialized citizens would. 
Although this Article focuses considerably on one philosophical 
theory of property, I hope it stimulates thinking among all property 
scholars who incline toward rights-based theories of property. In 
current property scholarship, many scholars assume a specialization—
and the exclusion/progressive property debate illustrates it perfectly. 
Moral or rights-based theories make strong claims about rights or 
normative interests within narrow parameters and only weak claims 
or no claims about policy consequences, it is assumed, while economic 
theories make broad claims about consequences and few claims about 
 
 19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 20. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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normative goals. As Joseph Singer has noticed, when rights-based 
theories are portrayed in this manner, the portrait makes property 
scholars seem “tongue-tied when asked to talk about fairness and 
justice” and needing a vocabulary “reviving the notion of practical 
reason.”21 Singer is correct, and productive labor theory provides a 
counterexample correcting the trends that concern him. To be sure, 
scholars may find some of the basic claims or operational details of 
productive labor theory less than fully satisfying. If these readers can 
look past the details of “labor,” “sufficiency,” “survival,” and 
“improvement,” however, even they may find productive labor 
theory’s approach to practical reasoning generative as an example of 
how a moral theory of rights might facilitate and focus practical 
reasoning about law. In that respect, I hope this Article offers 
possible lessons not only for progressive theories but also for 
Rawlsian property theories,22 traditional natural law theories,23 
corrective justice theories,24 and pluralist rights-based theories.25 
These same basic insights may even interest readers who find 
consequentialist theories of property more satisfying. After all, if a 
theory of individual rights can reconcile rights to social consequences, 
a welfarist theory should be able to reconcile social consequences to 
freedom, equality, and individual opportunity.26 
This Article’s argument proceeds as follows. Part I surveys 
contemporary property scholarship to recount exclusion theories, 
progressive theories, and the strengths and limitations of each. Parts 
II through V explicate this Article’s first claim, that productive labor 
theory justifies property understood as a presumptive right of 
 
 21. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 
905–06 (2009). 
 22. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 272–74 (1971) (advocating for the 
development of a “property-owning democracy” that conforms with his two principles of 
“equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity”). 
 23. See generally ADAM J. MACLEOD, PROPERTY AND PRACTICAL REASON (2015) 
(arguing that the common law institutions and norms of private property ownership are 
morally justified based on equal respect for humans as practically reasonable agents). 
 24. See generally PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 
(2014) (proposing a theory of property based on social recognition, which imposes implicit 
constraints on the owner’s decision-making authority); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE 
JUSTICE (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012) (applying a theory of corrective justice to 
various areas of private law). 
 25. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011) 
(arguing for a property theory that reflects pluralistic liberal values); J.W. HARRIS, 
PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996) (advocating a theory of property reflecting the complex 
elements which comprise property as an institution). 
 26. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the 
Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2003). 
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exclusive control and possession capable of being overridden. Part II 
starts with flourishing and shows how a moral right to labor follows 
from flourishing, and Part III shows how property follows from 
flourishing-based labor. Part IV shows how productive labor justifies 
property in the form of a right of exclusive control, while Part V 
highlights important fairness- or “governance-” based limitations 
productive labor establishes on exclusive control. 
Parts VI and VII demonstrate, respectively, the Article’s second 
and third claims; they show how productive labor theory anticipates 
the problems associated with progressive and exclusion theories. Part 
VI elaborates on some of the downsides with open-ended conceptions 
of “flourishing.” It shows how these downsides may be contained: by 
recognizing in citizens moral rights to choose their own paths to 
flourishing, and by vesting in owners broadly exclusive rights of 
control. Part VII shows how productive labor theory confirms and 
broadens progressive criticisms of exclusion theories. Yet productive 
labor theory can shore up the normative foundations beneath 
economic analysis of property, by clarifying the moral parameters 
within which economic analysis is defensible. 
I.  EXCLUSION AND PROGRESSIVE VALUES IN CONTEMPORARY 
PROPERTY THEORY 
Since Locke himself acknowledged that people appreciate what 
is “familiar and more particular” than what is remote and more 
theoretical,27 this Part begins by tracing how contemporary property 
scholarship is backing into Lockean themes. 
A. The Uneasy Place of Exclusion in Property 
As the Introduction explained, property rights seem to leave a 
logical gap between justifications and their operating structures.28 The 
tort of trespass to land illustrates that gap better than any other 
property doctrine. The prima facie action for trespass grants an owner 
a cause of action whenever someone else enters her land without her 
 
 27. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. I, ch. ii, 
§	14, at 54 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (4th ed. 1700). 
 28. For examples of how property law tolerates significant gaps between moral 
justifications and the legal rules institutionalizing and implementing them, see generally 
Adam MacLeod, Bridging the Gaps in Property Theory, 77 MODERN L. REV. 1009 (2014); 
Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).  
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consent.29 The entrant need not cause any actual harm to the land; the 
harm arises from the entrance itself.30 An action accrues even if the 
entrant enters in the mistaken belief that he has a right to go on the 
land he enters.31 If property rights are supposed to encourage 
investment by guaranteeing owners that they will reap where they 
sow, then why are owners entitled to property rights when they have 
not improved their lots?  
This basic tension runs throughout property law. Consider 
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.32 Steenberg Homes employees 
cleared a snow path across a field on the Jacques’ 170-acre lot, over 
the Jacques’ objections, in order to deliver a mobile home to a 
customer because the nearest road was covered in snow.33 Although 
the Steenberg Homes assistant manager who ordered the delivery 
treated the Jacques contemptuously,34 the employees who towed the 
home did not leave any damage on the Jacques’ property.35 The 
Jacques refused to approve a crossing in part because they mistakenly 
believed that they would have exposed themselves to adverse 
possession liability by licensing a crossing and in part simply because 
“it was not a question of money	.	.	.	[they] just did not want Steenberg 
to cross their land.”36 
Jacque illustrates both sides of property’s justificatory gap. On 
one hand, the case confirms that property rights entitle owners to 
 
 29. Heller v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 265 F. 192, 194 (2d Cir. 1920) (“Every 
unauthorized entry on another’s property is a trespass and any person who makes such an 
entry is a trespasser.”); Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 372 (1835) (“[E]very 
unauthorised, and therefore unlawful entry	.	.	.	is a trespass.”). Further, property includes 
intrusions into the subsurface and (within limits set for overflights) the airspace above the 
lot. Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60 
(1898) (“The general rule of the common law was that whoever had the fee of the soil 
owned all below the surface	.	.	.	.”); see also Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 759 
(9th Cir. 1936) (limiting a landowner’s right to sue in trespass against an overflight without 
“alleging a case of actual and substantial damage”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§	158 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Trespass protects not only “owners” but also all 
legitimate “possessors.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, at §	158. 
 30. See Longenecker v. Zimmerman, 267 P.2d 543, 545 (Kan. 1954); WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §	13, at 70–71 (5th ed. 
1984).  
 31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29, §	164  
 32. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
 33. See id. at 156–57 ¶¶	1–9. 
 34. See id. at 157 ¶¶	7–8 (reporting that employees testified at trial that the assistant 
manager didn’t “give a — what [Mr. Jacque] said,” ordered the crossing anyway, and then 
giggled after he got notification that the mobile home had been towed across their lot 
(alteration in original)). 
 35. See id. at 158–59 ¶¶	14, 20. 
 36. Id. at 157 ¶	6.  
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broad protection, of the sort associated with a right to exclude. The 
jury found that Steenberg Homes had committed a trespass, awarded 
the Jacques $1 in nominal damages, and awarded them another 
$100,000 in punitive damages.37 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
upheld both the trespass judgment and the award of punitive 
damages. The Jacques did not need to prove actual harm to deserve 
punitive damages, the court reasoned, because in cases of intentional 
trespass “the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land	.	.	.	but 
in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her 
property.”38 
However, the court’s justification for this holding was less than 
satisfying. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court insisted that “the 
private landowner’s right to exclude others from his or her land is 
‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property,’	”39 that and other statements to 
the same effect seem not arguments but conclusory assertions. At one 
point, the court argued that property protects the right to exclude in 
order to protect owner privacy.40 Yet the court did not explain why 
the Jacques’ interest in privacy warranted excluding Steenberg 
Homes from all of their 160 acres. The court argued that a cause of 
action was necessary to prevent the Jacques from suffering annoyance 
from intentional trespasses, and to reinforce social expectations that 
“wrongdoers who trespass upon [owners’] land will be appropriately 
punished.”41 Yet those arguments begged the relevant questions: Why 
should intentional entries be deemed trespasses when they are 
harmless? And even if entries create some annoyance, should non-
owners not have opportunities to excuse their entries—as Steenberg 
Homes tried to do when it argued that the road it wanted to use was 
blocked by snow? 
B. Early Law and Economic Analyses of Property 
Although this justificatory gap exists in Jacque and other 
practical materials, it is even more pronounced in scholarship. 
Important here, early law and economic analyses called the right to 
exclude model of property into significant doubt. That scholarship 
will be referred to here as “early” or “post-Coasean transaction-cost 
 
 37. Id. at 156 ¶¶	10. 
 38. Id. at 159 ¶	19.  
 39. Id. at 159–60 ¶	21 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)).  
 40. See id. at 159 ¶	 17–19 (discussing Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761 
(C.P. 1814)). 
 41. Id. at 159–60 ¶	26.  
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analysis.” Such scholarship is “post-Coasean” because it follows and 
builds on the analysis of property disputes developed in Ronald 
Coase’s 1960 article The Problem of Social Cost.42 Coase’s innovation 
was to portray property disputes as incompatible use disputes, in 
which parties rationally bargain to maximize net joint product.43 
Following Coase, Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, and many other 
law and economics scholars concluded that the best way to study 
property is to inquire which pairings of uses would maximize joint 
product in an ideal world, identify transaction costs, and then assign 
legal entitlements in the manner that seems most likely to maximize 
net joint product after discounting for transaction costs.44 
For better or worse, that framework makes property’s exclusive 
structure seem even stranger. Take Jacque again. It seems extremely 
formalistic to give the Jacques a legal right to exclude Steenberg 
Homes without any showing of cause or harm. Any decision that 
allows Steenberg Homes to cross the Jacques’ field without liability 
seems to avoid two obvious welfare losses: inconveniences to 
Steenberg Homes’s customer, and any contractual penalties 
Steenberg Homes would have incurred by delivering the mobile home 
late. Moreover, the Jacques were not using the plowed field in any 
active sense and Steenberg Homes did not actually damage the field. 
The Jacques also seemed to be excluding Steenberg Homes for 
irrational reasons, especially their mistaken belief that a crossing 
license might ripen into an adverse possession claim.45 From this 
economic perspective, it might seem sensible to require the Jacques to 
prove harm before receiving any relief beyond their nominal dollar, 
 
 42. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–4, 8–16 (1960); 
see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 155–70 (1996); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §	1.1, at 10 (8th ed. 2011); Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 4, at 375–83. 
 43. Coase, supra note 42, at 2–4, 8–16. 
 44. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 16–22 (2008); 
POSNER, supra note 42, §	3.6–.7, at 67–71; Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as 
Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 713–15 (1996); 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1017–20 (2008); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property 
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1090–93 (1972); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1985); Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource 
Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1473–75 (2013); Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control 
of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 16–19 
(1988); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of 
Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1076–80 (1980). 
 45. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 157 ¶	3. 
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and in the process tacitly recognize that Steenberg Homes could 
exercise a license good for one crossing only. Or, one might follow 
Calabresi and Melamed’s “cathedral” approach and concede that the 
Jacques did suffer a trespass, but then limit their remedy to a liability 
rule, like a fee approximating the reasonable value of a crossing 
license.46 
C. Exclusion Theories 
Post-Coasean transaction cost analysis helps property theory by 
reminding scholars to consider and contrast the possible 
consequences of different assignments of property rights. 
Nevertheless, indirectly, such analysis may abstract from the 
constraints that make property exclusive. In its simplest forms, post-
Coasean analysis focuses on use conflicts between two neighbors,47 
and it assumes that the parties and all onlookers can agree on the 
values and property damage generated by affected activities. Yet 
property rights involve not just neighbors but also a wide range of 
strangers. Parties may disagree sharply about how valuable a 
property’s uses are, and outsiders and public officials may know far 
less than the parties about how and why parties value these uses. 
These and other complicating factors justify keeping property rights 
simple and exception-free—not subject to context-specific balancing, 
as early transaction cost analyses tended to suggest.48 Concerns like 
these led Robert Ellickson to observe that dogs “are superb boundary 
defenders	.	.	.	[but] quite useless in enforcing a group’s internal rules 
of conduct.”49 Gradually, some law and economics scholars came to 
worry that earlier law and economic analyses of property had been 
applying “graduate studies” methods to “elementary school” 
problems,50 or that earlier scholarship had neglected “the problem of 
order” to focus too much on “the refined problems of concern in 
advanced economies.”51 
Exclusion theories elaborate on these concerns. Although 
exclusion theories do not insist that exclusion is logically necessary in 
property,52 they do maintain that a right of exclusive control is 
 
 46. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1106–10. 
 47. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 370–71, 375.  
 48. See supra Section I.B. 
 49. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1329. 
 50. Epstein, supra note 4, at 2096. 
 51. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 398. 
 52. See Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist 
Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 223, 229–30 (2011). 
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practically necessary, a presumptive starting strategy that should be 
overridden only for good cause.53 For example, following Ellickson’s 
suggestions about dogs and boundaries, Thomas Merrill and Henry 
Smith defended exclusive property as “a device that must coordinate 
the actions of a large and anonymous group of people.”54 Although 
Merrill and Smith acknowledge that the exclusive model may be 
overridden, they stress that exclusion makes sense only as a starting 
strategy.55 Merrill and Smith read Jacque as a case confirming their 
view; in their opinion, Steenberg Homes was culpable because its 
agents deliberately flouted a design model for property that “must be 
simple and accessible to all members of the community.”56 
Similarly, in a defense of injunctive relief in property, Richard 
Epstein argued that such relief protects owner subjective value more 
often than other, weaker remedies.57 That argument also helps justify 
the result in Jacque. After all, the Jacques seem to have placed a high 
subjective premium on being left alone, or on avoiding haggling with 
neighbors or companies who might exploit them.58 Of course, Jacque 
also tests the limits of the presumption Epstein is willing to make in 
favor of subjective value. Epstein acknowledges that the preference 
for injunctive relief should be overridden for “momentary crises 
(private necessity) or	.	.	.	large-scale social arrangements (common 
carriers),”59 and one could reasonably argue that the winter blizzard 
that precipitated Jacque counted as one of the “momentary crises” 
justifying liability rules.60 Even so, Epstein’s account explains why, if 
an exception were going to be made for Steenberg Homes, it would 
be made from a more general strategy giving the Jacques exclusive 
control. 
 
 53. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 2106 n.38 (stressing the importance of a 
proprietor’s right to “hold” property). 
 54. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394–95. 
 55. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2063 
(2012); Smith, supra note 18, at S453–55. 
 56. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1849, 1850, 1871–74 (2007). 
 57. Epstein, supra note 4, at 2092–102. 
 58. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 ¶	3–6 (Wis. 1997). 
 59. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 2092–93, 2120. 
 60. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908) (“A traveler on a highway 
who finds it obstructed from a sudden and temporary cause may pass upon the adjoining 
land without becoming a trespasser because of the necessity.”); Epstein, supra note 4, at 
2108 n.47, 2109–10 (citing Ploof, 71 A. at 189). 
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D. Progressive Theories 
Although exclusion theories have helped explain the exclusion in 
property, they have not addressed the justificatory gap completely. 
Like all other economic analyses of legal rules, exclusion theories 
assume that economic analysis can supply adequate normative 
justifications for legal rules. This assumption was challenged 
vigorously in the 1970s and 1980s, as economic analysis became 
prominent throughout American legal scholarship.61 From the fact 
that a given rule is efficient, non-economists argued, it does not follow 
that the rule is philosophically legitimate, to the point that it could be 
enforced under threat of coercion and penalty.62 Progressive theories 
of property have renewed these concerns about economic analysis. 
Although “[p]rogressive property is more an orientation than a 
fully defined set of values or intellectual commitments,”63 one of its 
constitutive features is concern about the normative pretensions of 
economic analysis. In 2009, Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, 
Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler jointly signed A Statement of 
Progressive Property.64 The co-signers warned against making 
property law “solely a matter of satisfying personal preferences,” and 
warned that reducing the normative values property serves “to one 
common currency distorts their intrinsic worth.”65 In their individual 
works, Singer has marked off what he calls “severe limitations” in 
efficiency analysis,66 Alexander has warned that law and economic 
analysis suffers from “poverty of its analysis of moral values and 
moral issues[,]”67 and Peñalver devoted half of a recent article to 
critiquing normative justifications for wealth maximization in 
property.68 
 
 61. See infra Part VII. 
 62. See infra Part VII.A. 
 63. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 
101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 115 (2013). The rest of this Section relies considerably on 
previous summaries by Rosser, id. at 115–27, and John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in 
Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act of 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743–46 (2011). 
 64. Alexander et al., supra note 6. 
 65. Id. at 743–44. 
 66. Singer, supra note 21, at 904, 915–21. 
 67. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 750 (2009). 
 68. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 832–60 (2009). 
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legitimacy. See, e.g., id. at 823–24 & n.6 (criticizing five different law and economic 
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Works in the progressive property movement have offered 
alternative justifications for property, and two recurring features 
loom large in these justifications. First, progressive justifications 
ground property in normative interests in flourishing, specifically in 
pluralistic understandings of flourishing. Here, the progressive 
movement echoes in American legal theory themes prominent in law 
and property scholarship in Europe and the developing world.69 In 
continental European law, property has been understood to have a 
social function, which “evokes a plurality of values: equitable 
distribution of resources, participatory management of resources, and 
productive efficiency,” and leads to specific balances of different 
values for different “resource-specific property regimes.”70 Similarly, 
A Statement of Progressive Property grounds property in “plural and 
incommensurable values” covering life, security, freedom to live life 
on one’s chosen terms, and flourishing.71 
Second, because they ground property in pluralistic 
understandings of flourishing, progressive property theories also tend 
to oppose the Blackstonian right to exclude portrait of property. 
Property is often portrayed as a triangular relation between an owner, 
a thing, and non-owners.72 Blackstone’s “despotic dominion” image, 
and cases like Jacque, stress the side between the owner and the 
thing.73 An account of property cannot make primary the thing-owner 
side, progressive works argue, without unduly deprecating the other 
two metaphorical sides.74 Hence, A Statement of Progressive Property 
 
models of landowner behavior” and stressing the “limited normative significance of 
economists’ positive findings”). 
 69. Lovett, supra note 63, at 776 n.203; Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of 
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 70. Di Robilant, supra note 69, at 872; see Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, The 
Social Function of Property: A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 
1004–08 (2011). 
 71. Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 743; see Alexander, supra note 67, at 751 
(“[H]uman flourishing is a multivariable concept and	.	.	.	the multiple relevant components 
of human flourishing are incommensurable.”); Peñalver, supra note 68, at 867 (praising 
virtue ethics for its “recognition of a plurality of values”); Singer, supra note 21, at 944 
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 72. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 
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a property right is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the owner 
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 73. See infra Section I.A. 
 74. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF 
PROPERTY 131 (2000) (“Individuals achieve autonomy not by complete separation from 
others but by a combination of independence and dependence	.	.	.	[or] 
interdependence	.	.	.	.”).  
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warns that the right to exclude is “inadequate as the sole basis for 
resolving property conflicts or for designing property institutions.”75 
In the same spirit, Eric Freyfogle criticizes conceptions of ownership 
whereby “landowners possess inherent rights to use their lands 
intentionally, free of restraint, so long as they avoid visibly harming 
anyone else.”76 
As with earlier transaction cost and exclusion theories, the 
moniker “progressive” does not determine all of the details needed to 
settle a difficult case such as Jacque. Even so, because progressive 
theories relate property to flourishing and pluralistic values, they 
have a tendency to encourage legal officials to intervene closely in 
property disputes. Assume that a plaintiff insists that exclusion from 
her lot protects one cherished value and that a defendant insists that 
access to the plaintiff-owner’s lot will facilitate a different and 
incommensurable cherished value. That conflict seems to force the 
court to decide which party’s interest is more valuable to the 
community at large. Thus, when Alexander defends the result in 
Jacque, he does not do so by justifying exclusion as a general strategy, 
but instead by asking whether the Jacques’ interest in home residence 
or Steenberg Homes’ commercial interests contribute more to 
flourishing.77 Even though Freyfogle disagrees with Alexander about 
Jacque’s outcome, he portrays the stakes in a similar manner: 
“[E]xactly why did the Jacques	.	.	.	possess a legal right to be so 
uncooperative? No question of privacy was involved, Steenberg 
Homes was not knocking down crops or otherwise interfering with a 
land use, and it offered to pay rent.”78 
E. Lockean Theory 
In short, exclusion theories can explain the function that 
exclusion serves in property, but they leave doubts about the 
legitimacy of economic analysis. Progressive property theorists are 
right to raise those doubts, and they put property on more solid 
foundations by connecting property to human flourishing. However, 
progressive property works do not give a satisfactory account of why 
exclusion might play a role in property law. 
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When faced with an impasse like this, it may be time to step 
outside the confines of current debates and search for a different 
perspective. Here, readers should wonder whether any theories of 
property manage to justify exclusion while reconciling it to 
flourishing. 
This is why this Article takes a longer look at the teachings of 
John Locke. Many classical liberal justifications for rights take 
property and flourishing seriously. For example, following the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence,79 the North Carolina Constitution 
declares that it is “self-evident that all persons	.	.	.	are endowed by 
their Creator with certain inalienable rights,” including both “the 
enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”80 Even so, Locke provides a lengthier defense of property 
than Blackstone and other classical liberal theorists and jurists, he is 
well known and respected among contemporary scholars, and his 
justification for property may reasonably be linked to human 
flourishing. 
This last suggestion may sound surprising. Scholars on all sides 
assume that classical liberal theories of rights can justify the right to 
exclude—but cannot link property to flourishing. Classical liberal or 
natural rights theories are assumed to focus on negative rights, 
autonomy-based rights, or “will”81 theories of rights.82 Robert 
Nozick’s libertarian book Anarchy, State, and Utopia83 is often 
portrayed in property scholarship as the definitive justification for 
classical liberal theories of rights.84 In progressive property works, it is 
often assumed that classical liberal theories “provide[] a strikingly 
thin understanding of the social obligations of private ownership”—at 
which point they cite Nozick.85 Yet these impressions simply confirm 
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how helpful it would be to take a closer and longer look at Locke. As 
the Declaration of Independence and the North Carolina 
Constitution both suggest, many classical liberal actors valued 
flourishing. Although modern scholars anachronistically read these 
works to propound primarily-negative theories of rights, classical 
liberal jurists and theorists actually propounded affirmative, interest-
based theories of rights, where the “interests” in question were moral 
interests in rational flourishing.86 Philosophical work over the last 
generation has revealed that linkage, especially in relation to 
property.87 That work is getting noticed in the legal academy, as 
witnessed by Alexander and Peñalver’s observation that Locke’s 
theory differs substantially from the libertarian “position	.	.	.	typically 
ascribed to him within contemporary property scholarship.”88 
If Lockean labor theory can be understood in a manner that 
connects exclusive property rights to flourishing, that understanding 
may provide a robust alternative to property theories prevalent today. 
On one hand, if Lockean labor theory is grounded in flourishing,89 it 
can help progressive scholars by clarifying the case for exclusive 
property and reconciling such property to the values exclusion 
sometimes impedes. On the other hand, if a flourishing-based account 
of property can justify exclusion, it may offer a foundation for 
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property rights currently lacking in economically-based exclusion 
theories. To explore this possibility, the next four Parts of this Article 
connect labor to flourishing and exclusive property rights. The next 
Part starts with the linkages between flourishing and labor. 
II.  PRODUCTIVE LABOR 
A. Flourishing 
It is perfectly understandable why Locke has been portrayed as a 
libertarian and not a flourishing-based natural lawyer. As Blackstone 
is remembered for his “despotic dominion” passage early in Book II 
of his Commentaries,90 so Locke is remembered for this claim very 
early in his second treatise: “[A]ll Men are naturally in	.	.	.	a State of 
perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their 
Possessions, and Persons, as they think fit within the bounds of the 
Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of 
any other Man.”91 This passage makes Locke’s program sound like 
one of negative liberty and autonomy-based rights, and Nozick cites 
this passage as a point of departure.92 
Even so, Locke does rely on a flourishing-based approach to 
morality. The phrase “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” limits 
the freedom Locke describes within the bounds of the natural law.93 
Although this passage may not seem significant to libertarians, it 
limits and focuses the freedom Locke justifies—as Locke shows when 
he criticizes suicide.94 More relevant to property, although people do 
not need to take “leave” from neighbors to enjoy their rights, their 
rights need to be structured with due and sociable respect for the 
rights of others. Deeper in the recesses of the Two Treatises, Locke 
also intimates that “Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the 
Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper 
Interest,” and is always implicitly measured by whether its subjects 
“[c]ould	.	.	.	be happier without it.”95 And in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, which “establish[es] secure rational 
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foundations for morality” assumed in the Two Treatises,96 Locke 
suggests that “Morality is the proper Science, and Business of 
Mankind in general; (who are both concerned, and fitted to search out 
their Summum Bonum).”97 
These passages reflect the main hallmarks of a flourishing-based 
morality. Summum bonum refers to a highest or complete good, i.e. 
the happiness of a mature and rational actor.98 In contrast with 
deontological and consequentialist metaethical groundings, which 
ground morality (respectively) in the logical structure of the 
obligations that arise from moral agency, or in good consequences, 
flourishing-based theories (often called “eudaimonist” theories) make 
“primitive” or “morally fundamental”99 a complete, rational, and 
objective understanding of happiness. 
B. Rights 
Yet if Locke grounds political rights in “happiness,” a summum 
bonum, and other concepts associated with flourishing, why do rights 
loom so large in his political theory? In short, there are two ideal 
strategies for promoting flourishing. In one, the government or 
community leaders determine which conditions will help each person 
flourish, and they design laws and government policies to pursue 
those conditions. In the other, the government declares and protects 
individual rights in the hope and expectation that people will use their 
rights to pursue forms of flourishing they find particularly gratifying. 
Although Locke relies on the former strategy to a limited degree, he 
relies considerably more on the latter.100 He also makes the latter 
strategy central in his arguments and imagery.101 
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Although Part VI will recount the reasons for this preference at 
greater length,102 one justification should suffice for the time being—
what might be called “epistemological mediocrity.” A natural rights 
political program tries to be realistic and sober about what 
government can do. In post-Coasean transaction cost scholarship, 
scholars optimistically assumed that “[judges] may be able to 
approximate the [economically] optimum definition of property 
rights.”103 Many political philosophers are not nearly as optimistic. As 
Singer recently explained, “Long ago Aristotle argued that we cannot 
expect exactitude in the realm of moral reasoning	.	.	.	.	He began his 
Nicomachean Ethics by noting that ‘[o]ur discussion will be adequate 
if it has as much clarity as the subject-matter allows	.	.	.	.’	”104 
Notwithstanding their differences on many other important matters, 
Locke agrees with Aristotle in this respect. Although Locke concedes 
that “Knowledge and Certainty” can be attained in math and some 
parts of the physical sciences, human affairs are stuck in a “State of 
Mediocrity” in which actors can only attain to “Judgment and 
Opinion.”105 
At the same time, Locke worries far more than Aristotle seemed 
to worry about epistemological mediocrity in designing political 
theories and institutions. Because people’s knowledge and wisdom 
are bounded, classical liberals suspect, government promotes 
flourishing best when it acts indirectly.106 Often enough, government 
is incompetent at ascertaining what uses and activities best promote 
flourishing. Government is least incompetent at securing the low-
common-denominator elements of flourishing—life, health, security, 
and the capacity to enjoy love and friendship in families and simple 
associations. Because “these generic goods constitute a natural 
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standard for the human good,” government promotes flourishing as 
best it can when it “properly enforce[s] the conditions for people to 
have the liberty to pursue their summum bonum in the natural and 
voluntary associations of civil society.”107 Although Nozick does not 
embrace this approach himself, he fairly describes it as a serious 
alternative to libertarian thought. Even though “there is a kind of life 
that objectively is the best for [each person,]	.	.	.	[p]eople are different, 
so that there is not one kind of life which objectively is the best for 
everyone	.	.	.	.”108 In such a regime, a just community should define 
basic rights, to life, liberty, property, and basic association, and then 
let people seek their own preferred forms of rational flourishing in 
the free exercise of their rights. 
Before we study intricate details of property law, consider how 
this strategy applies in simpler settings, involving relatively basic legal 
rules protecting the integrity of the human person. The prima facie 
action for battery resembles closely the prima facie action for trespass 
to land: an unauthorized touching of the plaintiff’s person is a 
battery.109 Although secure control of one’s body does not lead 
directly to any one way of life, it is a necessary precondition for all 
rational and flourishing lives. Now, if battery were the only doctrine 
specifying the extent of bodily liberty, some people might sell 
themselves into slavery or engage in prostitution. Yet those activities 
are not consistent with rational understandings of human happiness 
for their participants, and they also threaten the rights of other 
members of the community insofar as the existence of those 
institutions encourage others to view their neighbors as potential 
tools for their economic projects or sexual gratification.110 Some 
supporters of natural rights might argue that mature actors should be 
free to enter into consensual slave-master or prostitute-client 
relations.111 Yet the differences between those positions reinforce 
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broader contrasts between libertarian understandings of rights and 
classical liberal, flourishing-based alternatives. Even though both 
approaches value rights highly, in the latter approach rights need to 
be justified by the extent to which they facilitate rational flourishing 
within a common moral and social order supporting everyone’s 
efforts to flourish. The classical liberal approach marks off a few 
outer-limit prohibitions on what people may do with their bodies.112 It 
entrusts authorities with responsibility to institute and enforce public 
morals restrictions supporting those prohibitions.113 Otherwise, it bets 
that most people have enough self-interest and motivation to use 
broad freedom to pursue rationally defensible forms of human 
flourishing. 
C. Labor 
This background gives “labor” its justification and focus. Since 
labor is justified in relation to flourishing, labor constitutes intelligent, 
purposeful activity contributing to rational flourishing in some 
respect. Yet a rights-based regime focuses on life, security, and other 
low and solid preconditions for flourishing. People may bracket their 
disagreements about the best ways of life, and agree to respect one 
another’s rights to engage in activities contributing to “the 
Subsistence and Comfort of [an actor’s] Life,”114 or “the best 
advantage of Life, and convenience.”115 
In that context, “labor” comes to mean the right to engage in 
activity pursuing survival or legitimate forms of thriving. That is why 
Australian philosopher Stephen Buckle defines “labor” as “rational 
(or purposeful), value-creating activity	.	.	.	directed toward the 
preservation or comfort of our being.”116 Similarly, American 
philosopher John Simmons defines it as “free, intentional, purposive 
action aimed at satisfying needs or supplying the conveniences of 
life.”117 
So construed, a right to labor stands in a middle ground between 
autonomy-based libertarian theories on one side and progressive 
property theories on the other. On one hand, a labor-based approach 
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imposes responsibilities on property use and ownership not implied in 
libertarian theories. As a flourishing-based right to life bars suicide, 
so a flourishing-based right to labor entails a responsibility to use 
property productively.118 That responsibility automatically rules out 
“acts of destruction or mere amusement.”119 Nozick famously asked 
whether someone can appropriate a sea by pouring Carbon-14 
radioactive tomato juice in it,120 and Jeremy Waldron asked whether 
someone could appropriate a vat of cement by placing a ham 
sandwich in it before the cement hardened.121 These hypotheticals test 
several features of labor, including whether the concept covers 
activity that exerts positive effort of no or negative moral value. It 
does not. In neither hypothetical does the actor contribute to 
anyone’s well-being; the juice and sandwich are instead made useless 
to human survival or improvement.122 
On the other hand, once it is shown that someone engages in 
some non-trivial and rational labor, productive labor theory takes a 
tack sharply different from progressive property theories. As 
Section	I.D explained, those theories often resolve such choices by 
comparing or balancing the disputants’ use claims. Because 
productive labor theory is part of a theory of rights, it defers such 
comparisons as long as is practically feasible. If one party has priority 
in relation to a resource and deploys it to some non-trivial, beneficial 
life use, that dedicated use should not be balanced against the needs 
or wishes of others without a clear justification. Jacque provides an 
excellent illustration as well. The road-blocking blizzard might create 
a situation in which interest balancing might be unavoidable.123 
Ordinarily, however, it is preferable to give parties clear authority 
over their own resources and to warn them to refrain from disrupting 
others’ management of their own resources. Because the Jacques held 
title to their lot,124 their use plans deserved presumptive priority and 
respect. 
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III.  PRODUCTIVE LABOR AND PROPERTY 
A. The Social Dimensions of Property 
In the portrait just given of Jacque, the decisive factor is that the 
Jacques already owned their lot. By giving conventional property 
rights great weight, that portrait may reinforce the impression that so 
concerns progressive property scholars: that property consists of a 
normative relation in which an “owner has a right to exclude others 
and owes no further obligation to them.”125 Productive labor theory 
does not create such a normative relation. To explain why, however, 
we must consider how labor rights justify property. 
A Statement of Progressive Property claims that property rights 
must “look to the underlying human values that property serves and 
the social relationships it shapes and reflects.”126 But progressive 
property theories are not the only ones to justify property rights as 
social relations,127 and productive labor theory has its own distinct 
account of those relations. One can see as much from the problem 
Locke takes as his point of departure: “[H]ow Labour could at first 
begin a title of Property in the common things of Nature	.	.	.	.”128 In a 
community without organized government, all resources are open for 
use by all. This presumption for open access represents not only a 
“mere starting place” but also “a concrete expression of the equal 
standing of, and the community relationship between, all people.”129 
To appropriate a usable thing and exclude others from accessing it, a 
prospective appropriator must show that private property respects the 
claims of all the people interested in that resource better than open 
access does. 
Productive labor theory makes four different considerations 
relevant to that showing. Two considerations are prerequisites that a 
prospective appropriator must demonstrate to justify appropriation: 
productive use and claim-marking, discussed in Section	III.B and 
Section III.C below, respectively. The other two considerations are 
overrides, considerations that non-proprietors may invoke to limit 
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claims to resources already appropriated. These overrides, sufficiency 
and necessity, are discussed in Section III.D below. 
B. Productive Use 
The first prerequisite—productive use—should be easy to 
appreciate. If a person discovers and starts using a resource in a 
manner that improves that person’s well being, he has engaged in 
commendable conduct. His effective “expansion of the available 
social resources” entitles him to continue his use, manage the 
resource, and enjoy the benefits that follow from it.130 Because labor 
and property are both justified in a rights-based framework, the 
productive use requirement is relatively easy to satisfy. In Western 
prior appropriation law, it is only the occasional extreme case, like 
using water to flood gopher holes, where an actual use of water fails 
to count as a “beneficial use” establishing an appropriative right.131 
With productive labor, if a resource contributes to any intelligible 
degree to someone’s survival or improvement, that contribution 
satisfies productive use. 
Yet productive use also limits property rights. As nonuse can 
lead to the abandonment or forfeiture of an usufructuary right in 
appropriation doctrine, nonuse also causes a property right to expire 
in a labor-based morality.132 A laborer acquires only as much property 
“as any one can make use of [the resource] to any advantage of life 
before it spoils.	.	.	.	whatever is beyond this, is more than [the 
proprietor’s] share”133 and remains open to others’ discovery and 
beneficial use. 
So structured, the productive use requirement anticipates and 
encompasses many social obligations or limitations on property rights 
recently discussed elsewhere. Some portraits of Lockean labor theory 
include a waste proviso; spoliation is one of many ways in which a 
proprietor may violate the productive use requirement.134 Recent 
works have stressed several social duties for owners: to maintain their 
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property in good condition,135 not to destroy their property 
needlessly,136 or to use their property solely or primarily with spite or 
malice.137 In productive labor theory, all of these various obligations 
are penumbras emanating from a more fundamental imperative of 
productive use. 
C. Claim-Marking 
The second prerequisite for labor-based property is an element 
called here “claim-marking.” When claimants use resources, they 
must stake claims to them and maintain those claims in ways that 
other members of the same community are reasonably likely to 
understand and respect. In law, this standard often generates 
requirements for appropriation, clear possession, or diversion.138 To 
avoid confusion with any particular legal term, the requirement will 
be referred to here as a responsibility of “claim-marking.” 
Claim-marking is a major adaption to property’s social character. 
Many basic moral rights relating to life and liberty can be fairly 
simply: by the private law rules on battery139 or public law 
“prohibitions against killing, raping, and maiming.”140 Property rights 
and obligations should not be so simple because all individuals in a 
community deserve equal opportunities to use resources for their own 
life goals. When anyone intends to appropriate a resource, that 
person owes fellow community members a duty to make her 
appropriation reasonably clear. As Simmons explains, “Labor must 
show enough seriousness of purpose to ‘overbalance’ the community 
of things.	.	.	. One’s labor need not be completed to ‘begin a 
property,’ but it must (to abuse legal language) constitute a real 
‘attempt’ and not ‘mere preparation.’	”141 Property claimants respect 
their neighbors when they engage in “real attempts” to appropriate 
and use resources; claimants do not respect their neighbors’ equal 
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opportunities to appropriate resources for their own purposes when 
they claim resources on the basis of “mere preparation.” In Locke’s 
terminology, appropriative effort does not constitute morally-
deserving labor unless it “put[s] a distinction between [appropriated 
resources] and common.”142 
In easy cases, the conduct that establishes productive use 
simultaneously marks the relevant claims. The labor that tills land 
simultaneously, “as it were, inclose[s] it from the Common.”143 In 
hard cases, however, productive use and claim-marking can diverge. 
Thus, if a land prospector discovers new land in an airplane survey, 
the discovery by itself does not appropriate the land. Even if someone 
pours Nozick’s Carbon-14 laced tomato juice into a sea for what 
clearly seems a productive use (for example, to feed fish), the pouring 
does not stake boundaries clear enough to demarcate what part of the 
sea has been appropriated.144 In neither case is the claimant respectful 
of others’ equal opportunities to use land or sea water. 
D. Provisos: Necessity and Sufficiency 
Morally, productive use and clear claim-marking establish a 
moral property right. When a claimant acquires property, however, 
that property does not entitle the proprietor to exclude others with no 
further obligation. Analytically, labor-based moral rights include a 
liberty, or Hohfeldian privilege, to use the resource, and a claim-right 
to be free from interference while using it.145 But the liberty and 
claim-right may both be overridden if and when others in society can 
prove that their preservation- or improvement-related needs are 
more urgent than the owner’s property. The other two elements of 
labor—the necessity and sufficiency provisos—describe these 
overrides. Analytically, and from the perspective of the owner, these 
provisos describe exposures (Hohfeldian no-rights) to the possibility 
that non-owners may use the objects of their property without their 
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consent, and duties to refrain from interfering with proviso-exercisers’ 
legitimate activities. 
These two provisos operate in morality as limits on riparian 
water use do in traditional riparian law. In riparian law, riparians may 
divert water, subject to exposures when their neighbors need water 
for essential life uses or claim equal opportunities to consume water 
for their own wants.146 In productive labor theory, the necessity (or 
charity) proviso reflects the limit protecting non-owners with basic 
life needs. Even though Lockean natural rights theory is structured to 
avoid picking and choosing between different forms of flourishing,147 
that preference may be overridden in extreme cases. If a non-owner’s 
“pressing Wants	.	.	.	where he has no means to subsist otherwise” turn 
on access to an owner’s good, the owner may not “justly make use of 
another’s necessity.”148 
The other proviso is the sufficiency proviso. The same capacities 
and interests that entitle any one person to appropriate and labor on 
resources entitle others to appropriate similar portions of those 
resources for their own life goals.149 Accordingly, a farmer may 
acquire property in relation to farmland by fencing and farming it. 
But if he appropriates more land initially than was consistent with 
others’ appropriating similar areas for their own uses, the excluded 
non-owners may cite the sufficiency proviso to force the farmer to 
give up land to the point that they have “enough, and as good” as the 
farmer.150 
IV.  PRODUCTIVE LABOR’S JUSTIFICATION FOR EXCLUSIVE 
PROPERTY 
In short, when “labor” is justified in relation to survival and 
rational improvement, it yields a social account of property. 
Proprietors are linked to non-owners by four correlative moral 
obligations: duties to use their property productively, duties to keep 
declaring claims to it, exposures to others’ urgent needs, and 
exposures to others’ liberties to acquire and use resources sufficient 
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for their own equal opportunities.151 Those linkages make labor-based 
moral property rights usufructs, rights to use and consume resources, 
limited by others’ having rights to access, use, and consume them on 
similar terms. If moral property rights have this usufructuary 
character, however, labor-based property rights seem to have the 
same problem as all the other justifications recounted in Part I. Labor 
seems incapable of justifying the exclusive and trespassory character 
of property rights. As Eric Freyfogle has asked, should we not expect 
usufructuary moral rights to justify “private owners holding 
something akin to use rights, tailored to respect the common 
good”?152 Part IV and Part V take up these questions. This Part 
explains how labor justifies exclusive legal rights, and the next Part 
shows how the sufficiency proviso institutes important limitations on 
those rights. 
A. Practical Reasoning About Substantive Property Rights 
When scholars wonder whether property rights should limit 
“private owners [to] something akin to use rights,” they make a 
demanding expectation on a moral theory of rights. If legal rules do 
not track closely the elements of the justifying theory, the expectation 
holds, they violate the theory’s principles.153 Although this 
expectation is understandable, it seems unrealistic and uncharitable in 
many settings. Many moral theories, and especially flourishing-based 
theories, tolerate a considerable amount of slippage between moral 
foundations and practical reasoning.154 
The expectation mistakenly suggests that productive labor theory 
is supposed to supply a specific template for law and politics. Not so. 
Productive labor theory provides general standards by which specific 
laws and practices may be judged legitimate or unsatisfactory. Moral 
philosophers commonly use speed limits and side-of-the-road driving 
restrictions to illustrate the relation between moral rights and legal 
rules.155 Conventional property rights and regulations relate to labor 
as traffic rules relate to personal interests in safety and liberty to 
travel. The elements of productive labor supply a “great Foundation” 
for property rights,156 which is to say they lay down fundamental goals 
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by which conventional property rules should be judged legitimate or 
illegitimate. The elements may and often do fill in middle-level 
concepts and working strategies in different property doctrines, such 
as the general presumption that any non-trivial and beneficial use of a 
resource establishes a good property claim.157 Yet conventional rules 
need not track the elements of labor directly—not if they facilitate 
those elements more effectively through indirect strategies. 
As a result, it is not automatically self-contradictory or unjust for 
a labor- and use-based system of property law to recommend rights to 
exclude without express use, claim-marking, or sufficiency 
requirements. Productive labor moral norms may justify instituting 
two- or multi-level strategies in positive law. Presumptive rules may 
be instituted for easy situations when proprietors clearly seem to 
deserve property or to be disentitled from having property, and 
exceptions or balancing tests may be reserved for borderline cases. 
When labor-based norms do justify multi-level reasoning, all the 
relevant property rules should be judged in totality as applied across a 
representative range of recurring disputes. The standard of judgment 
is whether the rules seem to facilitate, require, and protect the free 
opportunities of owners to labor for different goals and respect the 
claims of non-owners, as a practical and reasonable hypothetical 
onlooker would find appropriate. This is the habit of “practical 
reason” so lacking in recent property scholarship158—and the mode of 
reasoning that welfarists and theorists interested in non-Lockean 
theories of rights should consider more closely. 
B. The Practical Case for Rights of Exclusive Control 
Once this confusion about practical reasoning is dispelled, 
exclusive control becomes easier to justify. Legal officials should 
institute usufructs in some situations, rights of exclusive control in 
others, and combinations of those two basic alternatives in others. 
Each system should be instituted when it seems reasonably likely to 
facilitate the free and concurrent exercise of different labor-based 
interests—by an owner, by neighbors, and by non-owners with needs 
to use the resources in question. Different systems may apply better 
to different resources, economies, and communities. In a community 
in which fresh water is fairly plentiful for private uses, it may be 
appropriate to keep riparian water rights limited, both to conserve 
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river water for public uses and to protect riparian land.159 For land 
and tangible personal articles, however, exclusive control makes 
considerable sense. 
Three reinforcing arguments justify exclusive property from a 
labor theory. First, exclusive control expands people’s freedom, their 
autonomy, and their capacity to be self-governing agents. As 
Simmons explains, “Self-government is only possible	.	.	.	if the 
external things necessary for carrying out our plans can be kept, 
managed, exchanged (etc.) as the plans require. Use rights will not 
suffice for any even moderately elaborate plans or projects.”160 In a 
system of use rights, every user’s plans may conflict with and require 
coordination with the plans of others. In a system with strong control 
within clear boundaries, people are freed from needing to coordinate 
with others. That freedom empowers them then to dedicate their 
resources to ever more individuated and specialized uses—for 
residential or commercial goals, for utilitarian or idealistic and 
expressive goals, and so on. 
Next, exclusive control also serves virtue-theoretic functions. In 
Locke’s terms, exclusive control discourages “the Fancy or 
Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious” and encourages 
“the use of the Industrious and Rational.”161 In commonsense terms, 
control encourages the form of sociability embodied in the phrase, 
“good fences make good neighbors.” In a regime with usufructs and 
open access, there are plenty of incentives to consume more than 
one’s fair share of the resources currently available. There are no 
incentives to be self-restrained and to produce more resources; there 
are instead incentives to complain when other parties consume more 
than their fair shares. Separately, industriousness toward property 
encourages important republican civic virtues as well. When people 
live in communes or open-access regimes, the communities often 
develop family or status hierarchies to settle conflicts.162 Those 
hierarchies make leaders bossy and followers passive and servile.163 
By contrast, when people manage their own land, they become 
habituated to think about managing their own families, jobs, and life 
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goals generally. As such, they are more likely to react in a spirited 
fashion when someone else presumes to tell them what they may or 
may not do on their own lots. 
Exclusive ownership has these virtue-inculcating tendencies 
because of a third factor: productivity. Quite often, under exclusive 
property, “the Property of labour should be able to over-ballance the 
Community of Land” and other resources unowned and subject to 
open access, because “Labour	.	.	.	puts the difference of value on every 
thing.”164 For the right resources and conditions (again, land or 
chattels, in a community with a commercial economy) exclusionary 
rights serve several overlapping functions. Because rights to exclude 
others reduce conflicts between different usufruct-holders, they 
increase security and facilitate investment and long-range planning. 
Because such rights are simpler to administer, they make it easier for 
owners to coordinate the uses of their land with other people’s labor 
or non-land property. Security, flexibility, and other similar 
advantages encourage owners to produce from land what Locke 
colorfully estimated as being one hundred or one thousand times as 
many conveniences of life as could be produced without property and 
intensive cultivation.165 
To be sure, all of these justifications are implicitly at least partly 
empirical. Yet general knowledge about human behavior also has an 
empirical dimension. Since law and politics operate in epistemological 
mediocrity, legal officials may legislate relying on these 
generalizations and justifications until someone produces more 
reliable empirical evidence. Another of the functions of a flourishing-
based moral theory is to help develop a presumptive framework for 
understanding how people may be predicted to behave in response to 
different legal rules. This framework helps identify criteria of 
“relevancy” or “salience” to test the framework and its quasi-
empirical predictions. Here, even if Locke’s multipliers are a bit 
hyperbolic, his basic point has empirical support. From the years 1700 
to 2000, the average incomes of the peoples in the United States, 
Japan, and Western Europe increased roughly fifty-fold,166 and in 
these same countries objective metrics of lifespan and health 
improved similarly.167 By contrast, the usufructuary property that 
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Native Americans maintained in game animals limited their economic 
activity, the fur trade, to available habitat.168 Anthony Bottomley 
discovered a case study in the province of Tripolitania, Libya. 
Approximately three percent of land in that province was privately 
held, but experts believed that a substantial portion of the land held 
in common was as productive as the privately owned land.169 The 
property status of the land correlated with the choices of uses, with 
the private land being dedicated toward labor-intensive and high-
value products (like almonds) and the common land being used for 
non-labor-intensive and lower-value uses (such as grazing and 
growing barley).170 Hernando de Soto’s work has shown how 
conventional title increases security and growth significantly over 
non-conventional, use-based prescriptive claims.171 
Of course, these justifications for exclusive property may still be 
over-inclusive. Owners may, and in practice some will, use their land 
in ways that contravene the expectations just sketched. Still, practical 
officials may reasonably bet that selfish priorities will motivate most 
owners to defend their lots and use them productively. If and when 
they do, officials will need to ask the question created by any 
consequentialist system of reasoning: How overinclusive or 
underinclusive can a specific legal rule be before its justification 
ceases to justify it? 
In addition, overinclusivity may not undermine a presumptive 
right of exclusive property; it may instead justify limits. Productive 
labor theory supplies a conceptual structure and normative 
vocabulary for narrowing and settling disagreements over property. 
Here is where productive labor theory resembles Smith’s two-tiered 
portrait of exclusion and governance.172 Exclusive rights apply 
presumptively when clear boundaries and strong delineations of 
managerial authority facilitate different people’s labor more 
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effectively than use-based property systems.173 When clear and 
convincing proof suggests that owners are not using exclusive rights as 
productively or as vigilantly as they ought, the system may institute 
“governance” overrides divesting owners of their rights.174 
Furthermore, use-based “governance” overrides may also be 
appropriate when non-owners have unusually strong sufficiency or 
necessity claims on owned resources.175 
C. The Conceptual Character of Exclusive Property 
This multi-tiered approach to property is not appreciated 
sufficiently, largely because contemporary theorists assume that a 
classical liberal theory of property must justify property understood 
as a normative relation in which an “owner has a right to exclude 
others and owes no further obligation to them.”176 As shown, 
statements like these assume that classical liberal property has no 
relation to interests in flourishing or social relations. Statements like 
these are troubling in two conceptual respects as well. 
One conceptual issue relates to the character of “property.” 
Property rights can be strong without being unqualified rights to 
exclude. Historically, in Anglo-American law, property has not been 
understood as an unqualified right to exclude.177 One encyclopedia 
defined property as “that dominion or indefinite right of user and 
disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or 
subjects, and generally to the exclusion of all others.”178 Analytically, 
this understanding is better conceived of as a right of exclusive use. 
“Rights” of “exclusive use” give proprietors presumptive priority to 
possess, control, and manage their things for a wide range of goals 
(hence, in the encyclopedia definition, “indefinite” “user and 
disposition”). Yet such rights are limited (only “generally to the 
exclusion” of others), and they are limited specifically to reconcile the 
use-interests that owners and non-owners have in relation to ownable 
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things.179 Rights of exclusive use can expire when owners do not 
deserve broad managerial control, or when non-owners have 
particularly strong claims to access or use others’ resources.180 Thus, 
when scholars criticize the Anglo-American legal tradition for 
enforcing an unqualified or overly strong right to exclude,181 they 
criticize it for a commitment alien to the sources. 
Although this criticism is misplaced, it is understandable, because 
the prima facie claim for trespass does seem to embody an 
unqualified right to exclude.182 Yet this perception reveals the second 
misconception—that the analytical content of property lies in the 
prima facie cause of action for trespass to land. Property rights, like 
all other substantive rights protected in tort (and by contract, or in 
remedies), have a complex relation to the torts (and other corrective 
private law doctrines) by which they are protected. Different prima 
facie torts, defenses, and remedial doctrines are all structured to 
implement the norms prescribed by the substantive property rights a 
community finds agreeable. By the same token, however, to identify 
the analytical property rights protected in a legal system, one cannot 
look solely to a tort like trespass. One must instead perform the legal 
equivalent of a subtraction operation. The prima facie cause of action 
supplies the minuend. Subtrahends come from relevant defenses, 
remedy limitations, and extra requirements to the prima facie action 
for special situations. The difference in this operation is the analytical 
“property” that owners have in positive law.183 
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D. Illustrations 
1.  Trespass 
In common law, trespass to land institutes a rough and ready 
presumption implementing all the goals explained in Section	IV.B. 
Because trespass is organized around a simple “don’t cross without 
permission” norm,184 it embodies and promotes claim-marking. 
Separately, trespass’s clear legal structure facilitates 
heterogeneous uses of land. The Nature Conservancy and other 
environmental groups acquire land to conserve it for conservationist 
or aesthetic environmental goals.185 Trespass rules protect these more 
passive “uses” of land on the same plane as more active uses. First 
Amendment “compelled speech” doctrines protect landowners from 
being forced to let non-owners enter and use their lots as platforms to 
propagate ideological messages with which they disagree.186 The First 
Amendment reiterates what trespass already embodies. When an 
owner has a right to exclude unconsented entries, that structure 
makes part of the owner’s presumptive legitimate “control” and 
“uses” the right to manage the ideological goals with which her land is 
associated.187 Recent political theory and property scholarship has 
taken an interest in common-ownership regimes, on the ground that 
they create the “community” apparently lacking in a liberal political 
order.188 Yet it is much harder for communal groups to practice 
communal ways of life if outsiders challenge their control over their 
land on the ground that the groups are not using the land 
productively enough. Even if it sounds paradoxical, exclusive control 
provides security for heterodox communal ways of life. 
This same understanding helps address another possible 
question: whether an owner deserves “property” in the control and 
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use of a lot that is not being improved and is instead being held 
speculatively.189 In a simple, prelegal sense, the speculator who does 
not improve land is not using it productively. Once the community 
has money and exchange, however, that speculator’s conduct may be 
justifiable. If the speculator sees development potential in a lot, the 
speculator labors by discovering that potential, acquiring the lot, and 
managing it until he can find a higher-valuing user and complete a 
sale. When the speculator pays the original owner a price she finds 
agreeable, he contributes to her survival or comfort. If he finds a 
higher-value user and resells to that user, he indirectly hastens the 
process by which the land is used productively. At least in principle, 
then, someone who holds onto land speculatively in the short term 
can contribute indirectly to greater productive labor in the long term. 
Additionally, if a trespassory structure can facilitate beneficial 
uses in all these respects, the decision in Jacque seems more 
defensible. Jacque is a hard case in part because the Jacques were 
using the disputed land for passive uses—peace and quiet, aesthetic 
enjoyment, or perhaps even just as a buffer between their residential 
uses of their house and their neighbors’ land uses.190 To that extent, 
the Jacques’ uses were defensible, and not very different from other 
passive—but no less legitimate—uses, like those of the Nature 
Conservancy or someone making a compelled speech argument. 
Jacque is also a close case because the Jacques may have been acting 
irrationally due to their mistaken understanding of adverse 
possession.191 Here, however, trespass justified not by whether it is 
overinclusive in any single dispute but by whether, in the range of 
situations to which it applies, it facilitates productive labor by all 
owners and non-owners. Other owners in the Jacques’ shoes might 
have had good-faith desires and rational grounds to keep the field in 
dispute undisturbed. These considerations do not flatly require that 
the Jacques prevail, but they do make the judgment in Jacque seem 
far more sensible than it seems in post-Coasean transaction-cost or 
progressive scholarship. 
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2.  Necessity 
Again, however, the presumption for exclusive control is subject 
to limitations, including the privilege of necessity.192 In some 
situations, someone may be able to show clearly and convincingly that 
her need for a resource is graver and more urgent than a conventional 
owner’s intentions—as in cases in which the necessity proviso 
arises.193 The necessity privilege institutes in tort doctrine a moral 
limitation approximating the necessity proviso in morality.194 This 
privilege (in the nature of a defense) entitles a person to enter and 
commandeer someone else’s property when doing so seems 
reasonably necessary to avoid a serious threat to life or destruction of 
one’s own property.195 
Now, within any legal system, people may argue where to draw 
the lines between the presumption for exclusive control and the 
exceptional circumstances where “necessities” privilege entries that 
would otherwise be trespasses. Jacque also illustrates this point: 
perhaps the scope of “necessity” should be broadened to cover not 
only emergencies where people and property face serious harm, but 
also problems like the blizzard in Jacque, in which lack of access 
threatens non-dangerous but serious inconvenience. Here too, the 
role of productive labor theory is not to determine a specific result for 
a hard case, but to set up the normative framework in which that 
result is reasoned. Productive labor theory creates a general starting 
presumption for the Jacques and other owners’ having a right to 
exclude, because exclusive control ordinarily encourages productivity 
and clear ownership claims. If Steenberg Homes or some other non-
owner wants to plead an exception, they must show that the exception 
will not undermine those goals. In that spirit, the Jacques could ask 
why Steenberg Homes promised to deliver a mobile home to a 
Wisconsin customer in February, or whether Steenberg Homes 
deserved the benefit of a necessity exception when its assistant 
manager was witnessed not to have “give[n] a —” why the Jacques 
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protested and to have giggled after being told that the mobile home 
had crossed their lot.196 
3.  Adverse Possession 
Trespass facilitates labor on the basis of another assumption: 
even if an exclusionary property right does not expressly require 
owners to use their lots productively and vigilantly, self-interest will 
motivate most owners to use their lots in those ways anyway. In some 
repeat class of cases, however, there may be clear and convincing 
proof that a class of owners are neglecting their productive use and 
claim-marking responsibilities. In those cases, productive labor theory 
permits overrides. 
In common law, adverse possession seems well suited to institute 
such an override. Adverse possession entitles an adverse occupant to 
repel a suit for trespass—and divest the title owner of title—if she 
occupies the owner’s land exclusively, openly, continuously, and 
adversely for the local jurisdiction’s limitations period for trespass.197 
Adverse possession is a vexing doctrine to justify. Some leading 
accounts justify the defense on the ground that it rewards “the 
productive use of land” by the adverse possessor.198 Other accounts 
maintain that it quiets title to properties burdened by stale land 
claims.199 
Although adverse possession serves both of these functions, in a 
labor-based framework both are subsidiary to a third function: to 
disentitle title owners who violate the two prerequisites of labor. By 
definition, any owner who does not repel an adverse occupancy for 
several years is violating her responsibility to mark her claims to her 
lot.200 As nineteenth-century squatters rights disputes confirm, claim 
neglect breeds conflict.201 Squatters come to believe they have good 
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claims to the land they occupy and use, neighbors and other 
onlookers come to sympathize with squatters, and those claims and 
sympathies undermine respect for the rule of law.202 The conduct that 
supplies direct proof of claim neglect provides strong circumstantial 
evidence of unproductiveness. Now, when I say that this neglect-
punishing function is adverse possession’s most fundamental function, 
I do not mean to suggest that adverse possession disregards the labor 
of adverse possessors. Taken together, the requirements of 
occupancy, exclusivity, and openness assign title in the individual who 
has staked a clear claim to the lot in dispute, and it is reasonable to 
presume that such an individual uses the land more productively than 
anyone else. Nor do I mean to deny that adverse possession quiets 
title; the doctrine does avoid title disputes, by establishing title on 
possession when evidence seems likely to be stale. Nevertheless, the 
neglect-punishing function precedes the other two logically; the other 
two do not come into play until a title owner forfeits his claim of title. 
As Carol Rose explains, adverse possession is not so much “a reward 
to the useful laborer at the expense of the sluggard” as it is a 
recognition of the “useful labor [in] the very act of speaking clearly 
and distinctly about one’s claims to property.”203 
Of course, adverse possession generates further overinclusivity 
and underinclusivity problems. If a neglectful owner evicts an adverse 
occupant just one month short of the limitations period, she seems to 
escape on a technicality. The rules that apply to wholesale squatting 
cases may not apply well to backyard boundary disputes.204 Here too, 
however, a system of trespass plus adverse possession needs to be 
judged by how well it facilitates productive labor, within clear 
property claims, in totality. Any discretion used to deal with 
opportunistic neglectful owners could also be used by opportunistic 
squatters and could destabilize the functions of exclusive control. A 
prudent official might still build more discretion into adverse 
possession doctrine, but he would need to consider the pros and the 
cons of discretion, using rough consequentialist forecasts, before 
deciding whether to do so.  
Similarly, even if a system of trespass-plus-adverse-possession is 
imperfect, the alternatives could be worse. If common law land-based 
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torts built in use limits, as common law appropriative water rights do, 
any of a multitude of non-owners could accuse an owner of under 
using her property. And after the state disentitled that title owner, it 
would then need to determine which of those non-owners was the 
most deserving replacement owner. In short, although adverse 
possession suffers from overinclusivity and underinclusivity problems, 
those problems seem prices worth paying to get the advantages of 
two- or multi-level systems of regulation. 
V.  DEONTOLOGICAL LIMITS ON EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY 
As the last Part showed, productive labor theory supplies an 
indirect, presumptive justification for exclusive property, and it also 
marks off outer limits on that justification. As Section IV.D showed, 
that justification can adapt legal property rights to conform to the 
moral requirements associated with productive use, claim-marking, 
and the necessity proviso. Yet Part IV did not study how exclusive 
property rights accommodate the sufficiency proviso. 
A. Exclusive Control and the Sufficiency Proviso 
The sufficiency proviso is not as easy to reconcile to property 
rights as the other three components of labor. Although exclusive 
property gives owners more privacy and freedom to pursue their own 
individual goals, it also restricts non-owners’ opportunities for similar 
privacy. Although exclusive land ownership may incentivize owners 
to produce more food, shelter, and other resources, it denies non-
owners opportunities to produce resources from the same land. A 
labor-based justification for exclusive property needs to explain how 
it deals with these sufficiency claims. At least superficially, such a 
justification seems to disregard those claims. Trespass has a necessity 
privilege but no sufficiency defenses. That perception leads some 
scholars to assume that labor-based property “ha[s] nothing to do 
with society and its collective good,” including but not limited to the 
needs of non-owners.205 
Nozick disagreed; he argued that increased productivity from 
ownership “satisfies the intent behind the ‘enough and as good left 
over’ proviso.”206 To some readers, however, that response seems to 
undermine the force and coherency of labor theory. Rights-based 
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theories seem most forceful when they make “entitlement	.	.	.	a matter 
of natural right, superior to all manipulations of the state in the 
interest of social welfare”; a right-holder must be able to insist that 
the right be protected though the heavens fall (fiat justitia, ruat 
caelum) or else the right is not really a right.207 
B. The Deontological Character of Productive Labor Theory 
Herein lies another misperception about flourishing-based 
practical reasoning. Many theories of rights, including many 
flourishing-based theories, do not have the character just described. 
John Rawls once protested: “All ethical doctrines worth our attention 
take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did 
not would simply be irrational, crazy.”208 Rawls also offered a more 
attractive and capacious understanding of rights-based theories: 
“deontological” theories. Productive labor theory is deontological in 
Rawls’s sense without generating absolute or illimitable rights. 
In Rawls’s usage, a theory of politics is deontological if it makes 
the Right lexically prior to the Good.209 The Good consists of the 
general advantages a proposal is likely to confer on the citizenry at 
large.210 In a deontological morality, the Right consists of important 
normative interests held by individual citizens.211 So understood, 
“deontology” allows a political community to pursue socially 
advantageous policies; its main constraint is to make the community 
pursue chosen policies without trenching on citizens’ strongest 
individual interests.212 
Even though Locke and Rawls’s theories of politics differ in 
many other respects, productive labor theory satisfies Rawls’s 
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definition of deontology. Rational and sociable flourishing reconciles 
individual rights and the common good. In relation to property, the 
Right consists of the interest every citizen has in surviving, in having 
an equal opportunity to satisfy basic preconditions for making her life 
better, and in being free to pursue a distinct program for her own 
improvement.213 The common good does not consist of any policy that 
suits the preferences of a bare majority of citizens. Because citizens 
are presumed to be rational and sociable,214 as an ideal matter, the 
common good in politics resembles the common interests of a 
partnership in law; it consists of “the good of every particular 
Member of th[e] Society, as far as by common Rules, it can be 
provided for.”215 Since the common good is defined as the concurrent 
and free exercise of individual rights by rational and sociable 
citizens,216 the Right is lexically prior to the Good.217 
So understood, deontology imposes one last major constraint on 
exclusive property. Morally, the sufficiency proviso entitles all citizens 
to equal opportunities to access and to use some reasonable share of a 
community’s resources.218 The proviso does not stop the community 
from extinguishing moral usufructs in positive law in the course of 
instituting private property. As John Finnis puts it, however, owned 
resources remain in principle “morally subject to a kind of inchoate 
trust, mortgage, lien, or usufruct in favour of” non-owners.219 In the 
worst possible case, exclusive ownership is justifiable only to the 
extent that it seems practically likely to leave non-owners with as 
many opportunities for survival and improvement as they would have 
had if the owned resource had remained in usufruct. Preferably, 
exclusive ownership should benefit non-owners indirectly. Some 
owners should use ownership to produce conveniences of life, and 
those conveniences should circulate to non-owners. 
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C. Sufficiency and the Right to Alienate Property 
In principle, it may be possible to meet that adequacy criterion 
through one or both of two overlapping strategies. In some cases, 
non-owners do not have strong or particularized interests in plans to 
use any given resource—only a general interest in having access to 
some resources for their own life needs and goals. In that case, their 
sufficiency interests may be satisfied by making property alienable, 
and instituting a common coinage and system of commerce.220 
When this strategy suffices, the sufficiency proviso is embodied 
not by any element of or defense to trespass, but in the powers to 
alienate property, to acquire it, and to make contracts. At least in 
theory, when exclusive ownership encourages owners to produce 
surplus resources, non-owners can earn money and then use earnings 
to buy the goods they need for their own life goals. As Buckle puts it, 
“[t]he bounty produced by the propertied extends to the 
unpropertied, improving their condition.”221 If the unpropertied 
“actually benefit from the appropriative acts of the propertied[,]” 
exclusive ownership not only facilitates labor but also respects the 
interests marked off by the sufficiency proviso.222 Of course, it is an 
implicitly empirical question whether a given system of property does 
in fact encourage produce to circulate to the unpropertied. Again, 
however, at least in principle, there must be some situations in which 
ownership is productive enough, and commerce robust enough, to 
satisfy the adequacy criterion set by the sufficiency proviso. In 
practice in American, European, and Japanese economies since 1700, 
rising tides have lifted most boats.223 And if a given system of property 
seems unlikely to satisfy this adequacy criterion, exceptions may be 
instituted. The system may scale back the scope of exclusive property 
and institute stronger use claims, or it may remedy the problems by 
instituting public programs ensuring the needy opportunities to work 
and earn basic material support.224 
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D. Sufficiency and Implied Easements 
The justification discussed in the last Section is most persuasive 
when people without property have inchoate interests in using some 
resources but lack strong claims to particular resources. The 
justification is not nearly so persuasive when some community 
members have strong interests in particular resources. In those 
situations, deontological constraints justify further limits—express 
sufficiency-based limitations—on exclusive property rights. 
The simplest doctrines illustrating this possibility are easements 
of access. Notwithstanding his “despotic dominion” sound bite, 
Blackstone specified that private rights to land were subject to many 
different “hereditaments,” which we might call “implied easements” 
or “implied rights of way.”225 Non-owners had usufructuary rights, as 
specified by common law and background statutes, to enter owned 
land for limited purposes: pursuing game, fishing, grazing livestock, 
collecting wood, and other similar uses.226 In antebellum American 
common law, these use-based exceptions significantly scaled back the 
trespassory and exclusive character of land ownership.227 
In fairly rural conditions, these implied rights of way are 
permissible and probably necessary limitations on exclusive 
ownership. When most land is undeveloped in a community, citizens 
cannot expect to acquire materials necessary for survival or 
improvement from labor, savings, and commerce. Many American 
states fit this description at one time; before the twentieth century, in 
many American states only one percent to twenty percent of owned 
land was improved.228 
If and when land is developed and becomes productive later, 
owners may then reasonably argue that production and commerce 
obviate the need for these implied easements of access. Those 
demands, and pushback by indigent residents, will make property law 
(depending on one’s point of view) social and flexible, or chaotic and 
indeterminate. Yet the same basic points continue to apply. In a 
system of otherwise exclusive property, strong sufficiency claims may 
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be accommodated by instituting use-based rights of access as 
limitations on broad rights of exclusion. Even if local judgments are 
not uniform enough, and even if there is not enough specific empirical 
information, to clarify where exclusion should end and rights of access 
should begin, productive labor theory institutes a multi-level structure 
giving ownership and sufficiency claims their due. 
VI.  LABOR, FLOURISHING, AND PERFECTIONISM 
This Article has now demonstrated its first claim: Productive 
labor theory justifies property understood as a presumptive right of 
exclusive control, and the presumption may be overridden when 
owners fail to labor or when non-owners have strong sufficiency or 
necessity claims. And the principles proving that first claim supply the 
supports needed to justify property in a more satisfying manner. This 
Part focuses on the first of those supports. Productive labor theory 
grounds property rights in flourishing-based moral principles, but it 
does so in such a manner as to minimize government decision makers’ 
opportunities to treat property as a right to do what they believe will 
contribute to everyone’s flourishing. 
A. Perfectionism: Theory Versus Practice 
Although progressive property is not necessarily hostile to 
property, it may inadvertently threaten property. Again, A Statement 
of Progressive Property celebrates the “plural and incommensurable 
values” property implicates, and the values the cosigners affiliate with 
property—security, knowledge, wealth, flourishing, and 
environmental stewardship, to name a few—seem hard to reconcile.229 
This portrait of property legitimates a train of reasoning: an owner 
values A; a non-owner values B; A and B are incommensurable; and 
since there is no other way to resolve the value conflict, a legal 
decision maker must, however reluctantly, prefer one to the other. 
Property gets reduced to a right to use one’s own as judges or 
regulators deem necessary for the flourishing of others or the 
community at large. 
Productive labor theory is structured to anticipate and avoid 
legitimating that train of reasoning. Exclusive rights give different 
individuals freedom to decide for themselves whether, on their own 
lots, to value A, B, or other sources of gratification. In a few cases, 
such as in dire emergencies, value choices are unavoidable. In many 
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others, legal officials can promote everyone’s flourishing simply by 
requiring everyone to respect one another’s property. Yet when legal 
officials can avoid pitting specific land uses against one another and 
do so anyway, they indirectly undermine the conditions for 
everyone’s flourishing. 
Section II.B recounted the most basic reason why: reliably often, 
public officials know significantly less than affected citizens about 
whether or how a given resource will help them flourish, simply 
because self-interest gives the citizens incentives to consider those 
questions more seriously than the officials will. Yet there are other 
reasons. First, all too often, people get blinded by “self-love,” and 
people so blinded will agitate for policies that are “partial to [the 
interests of] themselves and their Friends.”230 Here, Locke expresses 
in his vernacular concepts similar to Federalist No. 10’s account of 
faction,231 or public choice and economic theories of regulation.232 If 
property rights are directly linked to flourishing in politics, non-
owners—and especially wealthy non-owners—are likely to lobby the 
government to redistribute property on the ground that they will 
promote flourishing throughout the community better than the 
owners themselves will. 
Second, politics attracts political extremists. Political life, 
especially in a large liberal nation-state, attracts “Quarrelsom and 
Contentious” character types who harbor extreme religious or 
ideological opinions.233 Politics also attracts character types who love 
eminence, and when such types have leisure they may be quarrelsome 
and contentious in pursuit of political position.234 Character types like 
these are likely to be attracted, as practically-minded citizens are not, 
to reform programs that require property to be used for the common 
good, in ways that are demanding and likely to frustrate owners’ 
private plans. 
These risks cannot be wholly avoided in property or in any other 
field of law. But productive labor theory structures property to 
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minimize the risks. If one believes, as classical liberals do, that 
political life is extremely partisan and that people’s needs and 
interests toward different resources vary extremely widely, legal rules 
that focus heavily on flourishing will unfortunately boomerang. Such 
rules may restrict freedom and equal opportunity as properties 
become restricted by side limitations related to different flourishing-
related needs. Flourishing-related arguments may attract special 
interests and encourage property to get caught up in ideological 
conflicts over property. And since flourishing-related legal tests 
require context-specific balancing, they give greater influence to 
insiders.235 More marginalized groups in a community will benefit 
from simple and uniform property rules; insiders will better exploit 
ambiguity. Obviously, these concerns will not arise in every dispute, 
and they cannot be proven in any conclusive way. As the rest of this 
Part will suggest, however, the concerns do arise in some of the fields 
of law most celebrated in progressive property scholarship. 
B. Rights to Roam 
The first example consists of statutory rights to roam. Sweden 
has long recognized Allemansrätt (translated “everyman’s right”). 
Allemansrätt is a right of way entitling non-owners to roam 
countryside owned by others.236 In 2000, England and Wales enacted 
the Countryside and Rights of Way Act codifying rights to roam over 
mapped open country, mountains, and coastal land.237 In 2003, 
Scotland enacted an even broader roaming right, giving roamers 
rights to cross most land for purposes of recreation, education, or 
passage.238 Progressive property works often cite rights to roam as an 
example of progressive property in action.239 Progressive property 
works tend to ask whether roaming rights serve valuable life goals 
(such works say “yes”), and then to ask whether owners have any 
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interests in exclusive control concrete and immediate enough to 
override roaming rights (such works say “no”).240 
Productive labor theory offers a less sanguine assessment of 
roaming rights. The problems do not arise because roaming falls 
outside the scope of morally legitimate activity. When labor is 
grounded in relation to rational flourishing, the use of land for 
physical exercise and recreational enjoyment constitutes moral 
labor.241 Yet it does not necessarily follow that mandated roaming 
rights are desirable. A government could facilitate the same 
flourishing-related activities by buying or condemning scenic land and 
paths, and converting them into parks or trails managed by the 
government or a public delegate. Although purchase or 
condemnation would be more expensive, they would keep brighter 
lines between private property and public recreational functions. And 
if one thinks through why condemnation is expensive, those costs 
bring to light adverse social consequences from roaming statutes. 
Those consequences have not been adequately considered in 
scholarship supportive of roaming rights. 
One issue is a short-term/long-term problem. Conventional 
portraits of roaming rights may overemphasize the demands of 
roamers and underemphasize the impact of roaming rights on 
ownership. This imbalance is understandable. A roamer wants to 
derive present enjoyment from crossing a particular plot of land. It 
can seem churlish for an analyst to point out that, once roamers have 
some right to enter land, they might not stick to the trails or stick to 
hiking. Furthermore, the concerns that trouble landowners—lack of 
security, risks of accident—are not certain to occur, and the resultant 
harms will take years to arise if they ever really occur. 
Nevertheless, a moral theory needs a satisfying way to reconcile 
both sets of concerns. Moreover, there is at least some evidence that 
roaming rights chill land use. Swedish farmers have had to confront 
roamers to stop them from picking crops, and other landowners have 
complained that roaming rights have interfered with their 
opportunities to put their land to more active uses.242 These abstract 
and long-to-ripen conflicts may restrain land ownership. In a recent 
study of land sales in England and Wales, Jonathan Klick and Gideon 
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Parchomovsky discovered that 10% increases in roaming access 
correlated with 8% and 6% drops, respectively, in the sales price of 
land covered by reforms executed in the year 2000.243 Those price 
drops do not automatically prove that covered land is less usable now 
than it was before 2000, or that roaming rights are undesirable. At a 
minimum, however, they confirm that market buyers perceive land as 
less valuable for their planned uses. In a rights-based framework, if 
title owners are making some valuable use of their land, their 
concerns receive presumptive weight.244 
Separately, current scholarship may not adequately portray the 
class and geographical overtones of roaming rights. In a country with 
a developed economy, the land most likely to be roamed on will be 
rural and the likeliest roamers will be urban residents.245 Exclusive 
property rights express one normative message: if people want to live 
urban lives most of the time and roam recreationally occasionally, 
they need to convince rural owners that their temporary interests in 
roaming will not jeopardize farmers’ more durable plans for roamed-
on land. A roaming regime expresses a more partisan message: rural 
landowners must respect the land rights of urban owners when they 
come to town, but their lots are servient to the recreational interests 
of urban residents who choose to roam in the country.246 
Productive labor theory does not flatly prohibit rights to roam. In 
communities (like Sweden) where such rights have been recognized 
by long usage,247 roaming rights could end up being another form of 
implied easement that all citizens accept and recognize as part of land 
ownership. Yet because productive labor theory supplies a strong 
justification for exclusive property, it makes more salient than 
progressive theories the long-term effects of repeat entries by 
strangers on owned land. Furthermore, because productive labor 
theory keeps the exceptions to exclusive ownership fairly narrow, it 
judges roamers’ sufficiency claims by a stricter standard. Even if 
recreational walking contributes to rational forms of improvement, it 
does not contribute to a dimension of flourishing that is basic or 
imperative. In this respect, roaming rights differ from most if not all 
 
 243. John Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An 
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 29–39), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755613 [https://perma.cc/DF6A-MN6J 
(staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 244. See supra Section III.B. 
 245. For example, in Sweden in the 1980s, one expert estimated that only 125,000 of 
8,000,000 had land worth roaming. See Colby, supra note 236, at 257. 
 246. See Klick & Parchomovsky, supra note 243, at 39.  
 247. Katz, supra note 240, at 298 n.70. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017) 
2017] LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING 465 
of the rights of way familiar in Anglo-American law—hunting, 
grazing, and necessity-based emergency entrances.248 In short, 
productive labor theory helps clarify the case for exclusive ownership, 
and it keeps rural property from getting entangled in regional “way of 
life” conflicts between farmers and urban recreational roamers. 
C. Landmark Laws and Penn Central 
Landmark laws provide another helpful illustration. The best-
known landmark law—New York City’s—generated the case that led 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York.249 When a site is old enough and is determined 
(in New York City’s administrative code’s terms) to have “a special 
character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as part of 
the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state 
or nation,”250 a landmark commission may prevent changes to the site 
if such changes would detract from its public interest or value.251 
Although landmark laws raise a range of interesting issues, they 
are interesting here252 because they highlight important differences 
between productive labor theory and leading progressive property 
works. Progressive works have been sympathetic toward landmark 
laws,253 most often because they express a communitarian norm 
whereby an owner may justly be prevented from using his property 
“in some way that the community regards as against its collective 
interest.”254 Yet New York’s track record with landmark laws (New 
York’s scheme just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 2015)255 may 
confirm some of the concerns about perfectionist theories of property 
regulation. 
Productive labor theory does not make landmarking schemes 
flatly inappropriate, but it does portray them fairly skeptically. In 
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principle, neighbors do have and can claim sufficiency-based interests 
in the aesthetic, traditional, or community-oriented aspects of a 
nearby building. But those sufficiency claims need to be reconciled 
with the other factors relevant to labor—productive use and claim-
marking. First, when rights are assigned by a discretionary regulatory 
process focusing on subjective aesthetic or community qualities, those 
processes create claim-marking problems. In nuisance cases, courts 
are generally reluctant to grant relief for complaints about blocked 
light on this ground;256 they worry that proprietary rights to light 
would make it extremely difficult for landowners to get fair “notice of 
limitations on the use of [their] property.”257 Similar concerns apply as 
well to landmark schemes. 
Separately, boundary-based property rules facilitate the 
productive use of land by giving different neighbors equal 
opportunities to use their lots for different goals. When property law 
focuses on perceptible invasions, it focuses on the disturbances that 
hit owners most where they live, and it keeps the criteria for 
“noxiousness” and “wrongfulness” fairly apolitical.258 If the law 
expands to cover uses that seem ugly, out of place, or objectionable, it 
encourages neighbors to complain about nearby land uses they 
happen to dislike. Courts intuit this concern in private nuisance cases 
about aesthetic nuisances or access to light: “Because every new 
construction project is bound to block someone’s view of something, 
every landowner would be open to a claim of nuisance.”259 Earlier 
inverse condemnation cases worried that residential-only zoning 
imposes a “strait-jacket” on development and change in zoned 
neighborhoods.260 
The public law of landmarking does not need to follow the policy 
preferences locked into nuisance cases or now-repudiated inverse 
condemnation precedents. But these authorities illustrate possible 
downsides to landmarking schemes. Landmark supporters assume 
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that landmarks should be designated whenever they create aesthetic, 
historic, or community-related social goods.261 Productive labor 
theory identifies countervailing goods, namely different citizens’ 
interests in different active land uses. Citizens will differ in their 
preferences as between active land uses and a neighborhood 
characterized by more passive uses and a stronger sense of heritage, 
aesthetics, and community. Yet landmarking designations favor 
passive uses over active ones. In disputes in which all preferences 
cannot be satisfied, productive labor theory recommends erring on 
the side of facilitating the uses more necessary for basic life goals.262 
When authorities pursue landmark policies aggressively anyway, 
a classical liberal, rights based political theory makes seem significant 
four possible unfortunate consequences. The first is to choke the free 
use and development of local property. Fifty years in, New York 
City’s Landmarks Preservation Commission now exercises 
jurisdiction over 33,000 landmarked buildings and 130 historic 
districts throughout the five New York boroughs263—including 27% 
of the buildings in Manhattan.264 
Second, the landmarking process will probably become 
disputatious. Developers and affordable-housing advocates will 
agitate for looser designation standards, while preservationists and 
“not in my backyard” local residents will agitate for tighter standards. 
New York’s experience fits that pattern. In 2014, the city’s 
Landmarks Preservation Commission chairwoman proposed to 
“decalendar” ninety-three sites on the ground that the Commission 
had been considering their preservation applications for decades.265 
Most of these applications had languished because they were 
controversial, but the chairwoman attracted intense criticism for 
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taking the applications off of the commission’s calendar all the 
same.266 
In addition, the statutory criteria for landmarking (“special 
character,” “interest,” or “value”) are vague.267 That vagueness seems 
likely to invite arbitrariness. A current New York preservation 
commissioner agrees; in his opinion, commission determinations end 
up centering on standards of appropriateness: “[A]ppropriateness” is 
“a marvelous word, and it’s unclear what it is	.	.	.	. It boils down to 
whatever the commissioners say it is on any given Tuesday.”268 Those 
same standards may also invite censoriousness, a tendency by some 
political and community leaders to claim authority to pronounce the 
tastes that ought to be the community’s. When the Penn Central 
Company tried to negotiate regulatory waivers for its proposed 
renovation of Grand Central Station, a landmarks commission 
member recommended rejecting its proposal because the proposed 
remodeling would have been “nothing more than an aesthetic 
joke.”269 
Finally, when the free use of property is constrained, the 
distribution of and access to property may become more regressive. 
Because landmark designations restrict new development, access to 
these communities is generally limited to relatively wealthy citizens.270 
Further, because landmark processes are complex and arcane, well-
connected elites enjoy disproportionate influence in shaping how 
landmarking criteria are applied.271 Other prospective residents are 
likely to be excluded—especially outsiders, poorer residents, and 
members of races or ethnic groups not well connected to city elites.272 
The aftermath of New York’s landmarking has confirmed this 
concern as well. On average, the residents of historic districts in 
Manhattan are twice as wealthy ($123,000 versus $63,000) and less 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §	25-302(n) (2015). 
 268. Emily Nonko, You Say Tomato: How the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
Approves Modern Design, OBSERVER (June 23, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://observer.com/2015
/06/you-say-tomato-how-the-landmarks-preservation-commission-approves-modern-design/ 
[http://perma.cc/H6DF-7VEK]. 
 269. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 118 (1978). 
 270. See Less Housing Production, Racial Diversity in Historic Districts, THE REAL 
DEAL (Apr. 20, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://therealdeal.com/blog/2015/04/20/less-housing-
production-racial-diversity-in-nycs-historic-districts/ [http://perma.cc/G895-EZAE]. 
 271. See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST 
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 149 
(2011). 
 272. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 312–13, 316 (N.D. Ohio 
1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017) 
2017] LABOR, EXCLUSION, AND FLOURISHING 469 
than half as racially diverse as the residents of non-landmark areas.273 
Of the 206,000 units of housing built in New York City from 2003 to 
2012, only 100 (0.29%) were both affordable and built within 
landmarked buildings or districts.274 
Leading defenses of landmark schemes praise landmark laws as 
an example of a real-life institution refuting a “classical liberal 
approach [in which regulatory power] is limited to the negative 
obligation	.	.	.	to avoid committing nuisance.”275 Yet productive labor 
theory does not regard property as a right to do anything short of 
inflicting harms on one’s neighbors. Rights are structured negatively 
for the most part because such rights indirectly do a better job of 
securing citizens’ affirmative interests in flourishing. Negative rights 
are simpler, clearer, more consistent with the rule of law, and less 
likely to be tested by ideologues or exploited by moneyed influences 
to the detriment of less influential citizens.276 
Separately, although beauty, historic character, and common 
culture can all generate sufficiency claims and contribute to the 
common good, they’re not the most basic parts of the common good. 
The common good consists in the first instance of a community 
understood as a partnership that facilitates individual partners 
pursuing their own needs and goals.277 If a community really thinks 
that some particular piece of property will enhance the satisfaction of 
all citizens, for aesthetic or other refined reasons, it may freeze future 
use of that property. Yet the community should recognize that its 
landmarking designations interfere with more fundamental 
obligations to provide equal opportunities to people to pursue their 
own goals. The best ways to recognize these dangers are to structure 
landmark designations as takings of servitudes that ordinarily inhere 
in private ownership, and to use this eminent domain power only for 
the vistas and buildings most essential to forming a strong sense of 
local community. 
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D. Land Assembly and Eminent Domain 
The most vivid contrasts between natural rights-based and 
perfectionist approaches to property regulation arise in land assembly 
disputes. “Land assembly” is the term used here to refer to 
development practices, under state and local law, authorizing the 
condemnation of private land and reassigning it to commercial 
developers to build higher-end residential units or new commercial 
units.278 State enabling statutes authorize land assembly under one or 
both of two main approaches. Blight powers authorize localities to 
condemn private land and transfer it to private redevelopers if the 
land is “substandard,” “blighted,” or “deteriorating.”279 The U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to blight programs 
in the 1954 decision Berman v. Parker.280 “Economic development” 
powers authorize localities to exercise the same powers on a different 
showing: the condemnation and redevelopment is needed to improve 
local “economic welfare” through “the continued growth of industry 
and business.”281 The Court upheld economic development-based 
programs against constitutional challenge in the 2005 decision Kelo v. 
City of New London.282 
Land assembly programs illustrate how plurality, social 
obligations, and interest balancing can destabilize property rights. To 
be clear, support for land assembly practices is not a necessary or 
constitutive element of progressive property. A Statement of 
Progressive Property does not specifically praise land assembly.283 
Although some progressive scholarship is resignedly accepting of land 
assembly,284 more is ambivalent toward285 or sharply critical of286 the 
institution. 
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Nevertheless, A Statement of Progressive Property does insist 
that property rights need to be connected “to the underlying human 
values that property serves,” that these “[v]alues can generate moral 
demands and obligations,” and that “[c]hoices about property 
entitlements are unavoidable.”287 In land assembly disputes, tenets 
like these encourage a train of reasoning: owner property rights need 
to be connected to social interests in having a vibrant community; the 
community will generate growth or a unified aesthetic environment if 
it remakes a neighborhood; and private owners owe a civic 
responsibility to sacrifice their lots for growth or common aesthetic 
interests.288 This argument surfaces quite regularly in the practice of 
land assembly. In Berman, the Supreme Court described the land 
owners’ property rights as being subordinate to what it described as a 
“broad and inclusive” “concept of the public welfare,” and gave the 
legislature leeway to decide that “the community [would] be beautiful 
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled.”289 This same argument structure recurs in 
contemporary debates about land assembly after Kelo. For supporters 
of economic development condemnations, “[t]here is	.	.	.	a ‘greater 
good’ to be served” by programs like the Fort Trumbull program 
challenged in Kelo, “and some citizens should be willing to make a 
sacrifice if they are fairly compensated.”290 
Although the debate over land assembly and Kelo cannot be 
settled or even treated exhaustively in this Article,291 two points 
matter here. First, Kelo was one of the most notorious property 
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lawsuit of the last forty years. Shortly after Kelo was handed down, 
the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning it 
by a 365 to 33 vote, opinion surveys three months later reported that 
between 80% and 95% of respondents were critical of the decision, 
and forty-three states enacted reform statutes responding to its 
holding.292 Productive labor theory gives a powerful account why the 
citizens outraged by Kelo293 might be expressing good Lockean 
property and political instincts. Second, productive labor theory 
expresses well the concerns that make Kelo so problematic—concerns 
about perfectionism in land use policy. 
Most simply, productive labor theory supplies a starting 
presumption: if an owner is making some non-trivial, beneficial use of 
the relevant lot, it should not be condemned and reassigned for 
development by another private actor without a clear and convincing 
reason. This presumption is neither final nor irreversible. One can see 
as much in nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases skeptical of 
the expansion of eminent domain.294 Such cases construed the “public 
use” requirement narrowly to authorize only the government or 
common carriers to use condemned property.295 Yet some such cases 
also construed constitutional police power limitations to authorize 
some condemnations and private redistributions—say, for laws 
authorizing irrigation projects in arid territories,296 or authorizing the 
transfer of riparian land to an applicant who wanted to build a power 
mill.297 In situations like these, the proposed project promised to 
generate significant public benefits and condemnation was 
unavoidable in a relatively strict sense because the benefits could not 
be realized unless most or all plots of land were integrated into the 
project.298 
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These earlier cases construed “public use” and police power 
principles strictly because they started with the presumption stressed 
in Parts II and III: if someone is deploying a resource to some non-
trivial life-benefitting use, in most situations the best way to promote 
community flourishing is to protect that use.299 That presumption 
explains the opposition to land assembly and also that opposition’s 
intensity. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor expressed Lockean 
sentiments in the best-known passage of her dissent in Kelo: “Who 
among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive 
possible use of her property?	.	.	. Nothing is to prevent the State from 
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory.”300 
That presumption also informed other and earlier classical liberal 
judicial opinions protesting the abuse of eminent domain. Lest we 
forget, the Supreme Court considered Berman because the 
authorizing statute challenged in that case had been narrowly 
construed by a three-judge district court to avoid possible 
constitutional problems.301 Regardless of what one thinks of the 
doctrinal merits of the lower court’s argument, the court anticipated 
the natural rights themes discussed in this Section. The court 
supposed for the sake of argument that the condemned 
neighborhood: 
fails to meet what are called modern standards.	.	.	.	Suppose its 
owners and occupants like it that way. Suppose they are old-
fashioned, prefer single-family dwellings, like small flower 
gardens, believe that a plot of ground is the place to rear 
children, prefer fresh to conditioned air, sun to fluorescent 
light.	.	.	.	Is a modern apartment house a better breeder of men 
than is the detached or row house?	.	.	.	Are such questions as 
these to be decided by the Government? And, if the decisions 
be adverse to the erstwhile owners and occupants, is their entire 
right to own the property thereby destroyed?302 
This presumption is justified by several implicitly empirical 
background assumptions. As Section VI.A explained, one is a strong 
skepticism that centralized regulation with planning will succeed 
often enough to make the game worth the candle. Whether land 
assembly does succeed often enough is an empirical matter, and there 
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is little directly relevant information.303 The project in Kelo provides 
at least one vivid case study confirming that land assembly can 
backfire. Four years after the Supreme Court removed the last 
judicial obstacle to New London’s project, the developer set to 
receive the property in dispute had failed to receive financing.304 It 
took New London another six years to start this new project on the 
site.305 
Another background concern is that economic development 
powers attract special interest pressures. In New London, the Pfizer 
plan first arose because the chairwoman of the New London 
Development Corporation (the “NLDC”) was married to a Pfizer 
executive and used his contacts to identify and recruit another Pfizer 
executive to the NLDC’s board.306 The NLDC exempted from 
condemnation and redevelopment the Italian Dramatic Club, a 
private social club popular with local politicians.307 
Productive labor theory also incorporates a concern that, when 
government actors get to determine the highest and best uses of 
property, their decisions will get caught up in conflicts between 
different ways of life. Kelo struck a nerve partly because it captured 
this aspect of land assembly policy. As one former Connecticut state 
official explained of the Fort Trumbull project, Pfizer officials “were 
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trying to attract people with Ph.Ds. who make $150,000 to $200,000 a 
year to eastern Connecticut	.	.	.	and they were not going to tell them 
they had to drive to work through a blighted community.”308 
Ultimately, “The idea that she wasn’t worthy of living next door to 
Pfizer left Susette [Kelo] feeling scorned and slighted too. ‘Rich white 
people don’t like us,’ she said.”309 
VII.  LABOR AND THE MORAL VALUE OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY 
The last Part showed how productive labor theory anticipates 
and avoids the tendencies that make flourishing a troublesome 
grounding for property rights. Yet one may reasonably wonder 
whether it is necessary to justify property in relation to flourishing at 
all. Economic analyses can and have purported to justify property 
understood as a robust right to exclude. There are fine economic 
analyses evaluating trespass,310 adverse possession,311 landmarking 
schemes,312 eminent domain,313 and even roaming statutes314 with 
judgments similar to the judgments offered in this Article.315  
A. Efficiency and Legitimate Authority 
Yet it has not been proven satisfactorily that economic efficiency 
is a quality relevant to instituting property laws. In property 
scholarship, some law and economics scholars have addressed this 
issue; productive labor theory complements their works by filling in a 
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theory of justice roughly of the character assumed in their works.316 
As we shall see, however, some law and economic analyses of 
property assume that economic analysis can justify exclusion without 
addressing how efficiency relates to legal legitimacy.317 Productive 
labor theory highlights philosophical challenges overlooked by those 
works. Last, some leading justifications for economic analysis assert 
that it can justify legal rules without recourse to a theory of justice.318 
Productive labor theory (like a Lockean theory of politics generally) 
provides further confirmation that these justifications suffer from 
important legitimacy problems. 
In a theory of justice and rights, any normative account of law is 
defective and incomplete unless it addresses the problem of legitimate 
authority. As Frank Michelman explains, every law needs a “moral 
warrant for the application of collective force in support of laws 
produced by nonconsensual means, against individual members of a 
population of presumptively free and equal persons.”319 In moral 
terms, people are capable of reasoning about their own well-beings 
and choosing particular forms of well-being they find satisfying, and 
other things being equal their choices deserve respect. As a result, as 
a moral matter, any legal rule that stops a person from pursuing his 
own legitimate project for well-being seems presumptively to 
interfere with his freedom. The rule may be justified. An owner may 
be required to sacrifice property to pay his fair share of taxes, to 
compensate someone else for having violated her rights previously, or 
to contribute a resource the public needs vitally for a public use. Yet 
the justifications for taxes, corrective justice, or eminent domain 
connect the sacrifice to a reasoned argument. On one hand, the 
argument must explain why the owner’s rights need to be qualified in 
relation to the common good; on the other hand, the argument must 
explain (like the deontological constraints discussed above in Part V) 
why the common good incorporates a decent respect for the interests 
of the owner. 
This demand creates a challenge for economic justifications for 
legal rules.320 If “the term ‘efficiency’	.	.	.	denote[s] that allocation of 
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resources in which value is maximized[,]”321 why does the “value” that 
is maximized confer legitimate authority? As Jules Coleman explains, 
To look at the law as the economist sometimes implores us to 
do, from the point of view of behavior, and not reasons [that 
give law legitimate authority], is not to understand the law at 
all. For what is distinctive of law is that it regulates our affairs 
by offering reasons for acting that are coercively enforceable.322 
This legitimacy challenge may be met in one of two main ways. 
One is to argue that economic efficiency justifies certain legal rules 
irrespective of its relation to justice; the other is to accept that 
efficiency analysis can become normative if supplemented by 
“additional premises” about justice and rights.323 Several prominent 
exclusion theories embrace the latter strategy.324 Yet general 
justifications for economic analysis pursue the former strategy,325 and 
some economic defenses of exclusion avoid engaging the relevant 
philosophical issues.326 As a result, the next two sections recount the 
reasons why economic efficiency might not have the value necessary 
to justify property to explain why there are problems worth 
addressing, and how productive labor theory can help address them. 
 
sexual congress). If the parties start bargaining with any resources or wealth, it needs to be 
shown why those distributions are just enough for bargaining to commence. One also 
needs to determine what the “resource” is and with what legal rights and responsibilities 
its res is composed of before any bargaining begins. See Michelman, supra note 5, at 32–34. 
If the analysis suggests that rights may be shifted because they are efficient according to 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, that criterion assumes normative premises that may be 
debatable and may not be applicable across all act-disputes. See FLETCHER, supra note 42, 
at 158–68. 
 321. POSNER, supra note 42, §	1.2, at 16. 
 322. Jules L. Coleman, Some Reflections on Richard Brooks’s “Efficient Performance 
Hypothesis”, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 416, 421–22 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org
/forum/some-reflections-on-richard-brookss-efficient-performance-hypothesis [https://perma
.cc/A76U-4Y3F]. 
 323. KLAUS MATHIS, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE? SEARCHING FOR THE 
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(Deborah Shannon trans., 2009); Michelman, supra note 5, at 31. 
 324. See infra Section VII.E. 
 325. Although this Article focuses primarily on Richard Posner’s normative 
justifications for efficiency analysis, see POSNER, supra note 42, §§	2.1–.2, at 29–33, a 
similar critique could be made of LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS 
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 326. See infra Section IV.C. 
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B. The Normative Value of Efficiency 
Richard Posner deserves pride of place for his efforts to justify 
economic analysis normatively. Although Posner has proposed three 
possible justifications, each has difficulties. The first possible 
justification is that economic analysis helps maximize social value, as 
understood in classical forms of utilitarianism.327 Such forms of 
utilitarianism are problematic, however, because they assume that 
“utility” refers to “pleasure” or “preference” in hedonistic and 
subjective senses.328 When utility is described in terms of hedonistic 
and subjective preferences, it seems determinate. Yet that portrait 
also makes utility problematic. Subjectivism and hedonism legitimate 
the preferences of sadists, racists, tyrants, and other vicious people.329 
Separately, although it is never easy, in any ethics, to make any one 
person’s preferences commensurable with others’ preferences, 
incommensurability problems can be more severe when each person’s 
preferences are subjective and incapable of being valued by others. 
The problems that make utility incommensurable across individuals 
make it even harder to aggregate individual preferences into one 
social utility profile. Efforts to do so reduce individuals to being “cells 
in the overall social organism rather than	.	.	.	individuals.”330 
Alternately, the value being maximized in efficiency could be 
social wealth.331 Yet wealth maximization is problematic as well. 
Wealth is not a sufficient condition for moral well being; some people 
 
 327. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11–16 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., University of London 
1970) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., 1998) (1861); 
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 411–17 (1874); see also J.J.C. Smart, An 
Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9–12 
(J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (defending “act-utilitarianism” and its 
singular goal of maximizing “probable benefit”); Julia Driver, The History of 
Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/utilitarianism-history/ [https://perma.cc/DZG6-JEBE]. 
 328. Driver, supra note 327 (“The Classical Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill, identified the good with pleasure, so, like Epicurus, were hedonists about 
value.”). 
 329. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 10, ch. 3, at 1173 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 
Hackett Publ’g, Co. 2014). 
 330. POSNER, supra note 42, §	1.2, at 16–17. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed 
Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1197 (1997) (discussing the frequent failures of economic models of utility to 
successfully predict real human behavior); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, 
in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra note 327, at 81–82 (sketching a general 
critique of traditional utilitarianism). 
 331. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 494 (1990). 
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are more miserable after winning lotteries than they were before. Nor 
is wealth a necessary condition; some people manage to prosper 
without significant material wealth. In law, 
the wealth maximization standard	.	.	.	is (at least in its 
immediate applications) apparently biased in favor of the 
wealthy, is oblivious to questions of distributive justice, and in 
general disregards all human valuations or motivations that are 
not responsive to considerations of price, or cost, in a sense 
approximately measurable by methods available to economic 
science.332 
One last possibility consists of a combination of Pareto 
superiority and consent.333 Transactions are Kaldor-Hicks efficient if 
the social gains from the transactions exceed their social losses; 
transactions are Pareto superior if they generate social gains without 
making anyone worse off.334 Because Pareto superior transitions do 
not diminish the utility positions of any affected stakeholders, Posner 
suggested, it would be just to infer that stakeholders do not object to 
such transitions—and then to presume that they have consented to 
those transitions.335 Yet this justification raises problems as well. As 
Posner himself acknowledges, “the conditions for Pareto superiority 
are almost never satisfied in the real world,” because most legal 
transitions do worsen some individuals’ positions.336 Furthermore, 
even when Pareto superior criteria are satisfied, Posner’s argument 
leverages a positive statement about preferences into a normative 
claim: that preferences deserve respect even if the preferences seem 
destructive or antisocial. Pareto superiority does not necessarily 
describe a normatively attractive quality, Jules Coleman concludes, 
because “people sometimes choose to do what they do not prefer to 
do, and do not do what they would otherwise prefer to do, often 
because they think it wrong to act as they would otherwise prefer.”337 
 
 332. Frank I. Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 
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 334. See id. at 488, 491. 
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C. The Normative Value of Efficiency in Property 
1.  Exclusive Property 
The problems recounted in Section V.B. can trouble economic 
analyses of property laws unless such analyses are qualified carefully. 
For example, some works justify exclusion by comparing the pros and 
cons of open-access regimes and exclusive property.338 In such works, 
exclusion seems desirable because the wealth created by encouraging 
investment, reaping, and sowing outweighs the costs of administering 
exclusive rights.339 This justification assumes that a property regime 
can be justified by the wealth it creates. Yet that assumption raises 
the question of why some people’s enrichment, or the whole 
community’s aggregate enrichment, can justify a legal regime 
restricting others from access to resources they might want to enjoy.340 
Some works justify exclusive ownership on the grounds that it 
protects owner subjective value341 and minimizes the information 
costs that non-owners need to expend to process property rights.342 
Without additional premises, these justifications raise the problems 
associated with classical forms of utilitarianism and Posner’s Pareto 
superiority-consent argument. People’s desires toward property can 
vary widely and clash sharply. Those variations and clashes make it 
hard to reconcile different “subjective valuations” on different 
resources, or to reconcile such valuations with social costs like 
information costs. 
Although critics of economic analysis sometimes cite the 
preferences of racists and sadists to illustrate these arguments,343 
those illustrations may not be the most revealing examples. In any 
community, some people can attach to property preferences that are, 
on one hand, not vicious but understandable and still, on the other 
hand, extremely difficult to reconcile with the preferences of other 
citizens. Some aboriginal communities object strongly to regimes of 
individual exclusive ownership of freely alienable lots on the ground 
that the land held by their communities is “imbued with spiritual 
 
 338. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 55, at 2081–93. 
 339. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 4, at 354–59. 
 340. See Peñalver, supra note 68, at 827 (discussing how economic analysis provides 
little guidance in determining what the goals of property law should be). 
 341. See, e.g., SOMIN, supra note 294, at 190–92; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of 
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82–85 (1986). 
 342. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 385–88. 
 343. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 21, at 916–18 (“If utility is premised on both autonomy 
and equality, then perhaps we do not count the interests of racists in determining whether 
a law prohibiting intentional discrimination in housing is good.”). 
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meaning[,]	.	.	.	constitutive of the identity of the people who live []on 
it[,]” and not only “given to them to live upon, but also given to past 
and future generations.”344 That understanding of land use and 
ownership inspired at least some of the Native American opposition 
to white European-American settlement of the Western frontier over 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.345 Other citizens may 
have strong religious or ideological commitments to living in strong 
communities. In his 1993 article Property in Land, Ellickson 
assembled sociological scholarship showing why Protestant 
Hutterites, Israeli kibbutzniks, and Woodstock youth all preferred 
communal arrangements.346 Other citizens may be paternalists.347 Such 
citizens take satisfaction not from living in communal or open-access 
regimes themselves but from seeing their fellow citizens change their 
preferences to want to live in such regimes.348  
These three preference sets—for aboriginal ways of life, for 
intensely held anti-romantic or communitarian preferences, and for 
paternalist property policies—conflict sharply with the preferences of 
citizens who have more practical tastes. A system of private property 
needs a better argument to justify disregarding such preferences, and 
this argument needs to have legitimate authority sufficient to justify 
protecting private property with government force. 
2.  Land Assembly Powers and Other Limits on Exclusive Property 
Similar problems arise in law and economic treatments of the 
regulatory systems that supply exceptions to private property. 
Consider the law and economic scholarship on land assembly.349 In 
standard portraits, land assembly issues present a tradeoff. In some 
situations, a community may generate great social gains if many 
smaller tracts of land are reassembled into one large-scale project. 
Lots should be reassembled if the main obstacle to reassembly 
consists of owners holding out to expropriate the social gains. 
Reassembly should not take place if the parties favoring it seem likely 
 
 344. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of 
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1601 (2001). 
 345. See WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE 
ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 54–81 (1983). 
 346. Ellickson, supra note 4, at 1346–62. 
 347. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 
152–55 (1970). 
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Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 221, 
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 349. On assembly and its context, see supra notes 278–82 and accompanying text. 
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to expropriate owner subjective value, if the government process for 
administering reassembly seems likely to generate secondary rent-
seeking and other short-term administrative costs, or if it seems likely 
to generate long-term costs by undermining private markets for 
reassembly.350 
Unless such analyses are qualified by moral premises, they 
conceal problems similar to the ones recounted in the last subsection. 
True, there may be some affected owners who are acting solely from a 
desire to extract as much wealth from developers as they can, and 
there may be some developers who enjoy dispossessing landowners as 
much as Steenberg Homes’s assistant manager enjoyed trespassing 
across the Jacques’ lot.351 In many and probably most cases, however, 
“holding out” and “subjective value expropriation” do not convey 
adequately the strength or the complexity of both sides’ claims. In 
practice, both terms seem to be used in ways that assume latent moral 
premises. 
We can illustrate adequately here with the motivations and 
arguments of the supporters and opponents of the project that 
launched the Kelo lawsuit. The best-connected insiders were 
committed not only to increasing New London’s aggregate wealth but 
also to changing the city’s way of life.352 These insiders thought New 
London was decrepit, and that a new pharmaceutical plant and an 
influx of urban professionals would put the city on the map.353 The 
president of the NLDC brought a missionary zeal to the project; she 
described her inspiration to launch New London’s development 
program as being “like the hand of God in my life.”354 On the other 
side, many of Fort Trumbull’s residents were elderly and wanted to 
be spared the hardship of being moved from their homes.355 
Neighborhood resident Billy Von Winkle had spent two decades 
“turn[ing] some of the neighborhood’s most blighted structures into 
quality, affordable housing”; he thought he deserved no less than 
 
 350. See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 44, at 108–17; SOMIN, supra note 294, at 74–99; 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 44, at 1106–08; Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land 
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$700,000 for his work, and he became incensed when he decided that 
pro-assembly actors were using eminent domain to undercut his 
bargaining position.356 Suzette Kelo did not want to move out of her 
neighborhood under any circumstances, and she took offense at what 
she perceived as a group of “[r]ich white people” trying to take over 
her neighborhood so that incoming professionals could have 
residences with a nice view.357 Furthermore, onlookers—faculty at 
Connecticut College in particular—opposed the Fort Trumbull part 
of the project because they thought that the neighborhood had 
distinct architecture, and that it was unjust to use eminent domain to 
clear the neighborhood.358 
When disputants have perceptions and desires like these, it is 
difficult to make economic cases for land assembly by appealing 
solely to efficiency. Assume that leaders approve an assembly like the 
project litigated in Kelo on the ground that it seems likely to create 
net wealth in New London. When leaders make such a decision, they 
assume that wealth creation takes priority over elderly residents’ 
interests in peace and quiet, Van Winkle and other improving owners’ 
claims to just returns for their investments, the demands of Kelo and 
residents like her not to be treated condescendingly, and the interests 
of onlookers like Connecticut College faculty in seeing justice. Pareto 
superiority and implied consent do not eliminate these problems. 
None of the individuals just mentioned explicitly consented to the 
New London project, and when it disregarded their objections, the 
NLDC went forward with a Pareto inferior project. If some 
aggregative and classical form of utilitarianism grounds the 
justification for land assembly, that grounding will not be satisfying 
either. The preferences of elderly residents, Van Winkle, Kelo, and 
Connecticut College faculty seem difficult to reconcile with a putative 
social interest in putting New London on the map or increasing jobs, 
wealth, and the tax base.  
D. A Lockean Critique of Efficiency 
As the last two sections have shown, over the last generation 
legal scholars have raised serious challenges to arguments, by Posner 
and others, that efficiency has normative value standing alone.359 All 
of these critiques were anticipated by Locke. Consider first the 
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problems associated with classical forms of utilitarianism. Although 
Locke wrote his Two Treatises a century or two before Bentham, Mill, 
and Sidgwick, he says enough to anticipate preference 
utilitarianism.360 He is fully aware of the problem of vicious utility 
preferences; a major concern of his Two Treatises is the possibility 
that the human imagination, fanatic tendencies, and dogmatic 
tendencies may “carry [man] to a Brutality below the level of 
Beasts.”361 One of the main points of Locke’s political theory is to 
distinguish between the states of character associated with the 
“Industrious and Rational” and those associated with the 
“Quarrelsom and Contentious.”362 In other words, even if people are 
motivated by their desires and their perceptions of pleasure and pain, 
those desires and perceptions do not enjoy normative status if they go 
beyond what is sufficient for rational and sociable forms of 
happiness.363 
Locke also anticipates the main objections to wealth-
maximization. Locke agrees that wealth lacks normative value on its 
own “as to Money, and	.	.	.	Riches and Treasure,” he warns, “these 
are none of Natures Goods, they have but a Phantastical imaginary 
value: Nature has put no such upon them.”364 For Locke, people 
usually desire money and precious resources for one of three reasons: 
greed,365 desire for conventional status,366 or to acquire the means by 
which to satisfy survival and improvement-related needs.367 If 
flourishing is the theoretical goal, of these three, only the last is 
legitimate. 
Finally, Locke anticipates problems with making consent a basis 
for obligation. This suggestion may strike readers as surprising, 
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because Locke is frequently portrayed as a social contract theorist.368 
Locke does hold that individuals should not be subjected to the 
authority of a government unless they have consented to be governed 
under its jurisdiction.369 Yet once citizens have provided this general 
consent, it does not follow that they cannot be bound to follow 
specific substantive regulations unless they consent to those 
regulations as well. Indeed, Locke takes pains to repudiate consent-
based theories of property. Locke argues against consent-based 
theories, and for labor-based theories, because people might withhold 
consent unreasonably and cause their neighbors to “starve[].”370 So 
legal officials may institute labor-securing regulations, assuming that a 
just and rational citizenry has already acquiesced in a “tacit and 
voluntary consent” to such regulations.371 
E. A Lockean Rehabilitation of Efficiency 
Not only does Locke anticipate familiar problems with efficiency 
analysis, he also supplies a better possible grounding for such analysis. 
Again, Michelman noted that “a careful reader” of economic analysis 
“can always infer additional premises” about human behavior and 
sociability “implicit in the literature’s accounts of the efficiency 
virtues of private property.”372 Among other possible premises, 
Michelman suggested the following: people do value freedom and 
should be treated as owners of their own persons and agency, and 
people deserve enough access to their community’s resources that 
they can pursue concurrently their own individual life goals.373 These 
sound like Lockean premises.374 For law and economic scholars open 
to the possibility, productive labor theory supplies moral context, 
making economic analysis of property rights more defensible. 
Indeed, some law and economic scholars are open to this 
possibility. Let me illustrate with three examples, starting first with 
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Ellickson and his article Property in Land.375 Ellickson makes his 
transaction-cost-based justification for property contingent on three 
rights-based claims: (1)	people have rights to their persons; (2)	people 
deserve property in the things they make from their labor; and 
(3)	property rights entail liberties to alienate property.376 The 
justifications for property rights developed in Parts II through V can 
confirm and justify those assumptions. 
Consider next Henry Smith’s approach to exclusion. Smith has 
long stressed that his insights about information costs are compatible 
with both utilitarian and nonutilitarian justifications for property.377 
The account provided here confirms as much, within limits. On one 
hand, productive labor theory’s claim-marking requirement provides 
a basis in rights-based morality for most of what Smith says about 
information costs.378 On the other hand, the responsibilities of owners 
to use their possessions productively, and the sufficiency and 
necessity provisos, impose broad outer limits on the situations when 
information costs deserve to take priority. These limits lay the 
foundations for limits on property, one presumes, reflected in the 
governance-based limits Smith recognizes on exclusion.379 
Productive labor theory can also complement consequentialist 
theories justifying property rights. Productive labor theory reconciles 
property rights to the common good, by justifying both in relation to 
rational interests in survival and preservation. In principle, a theory of 
consequentialism may make similar moves from social welfare to 
individual rights; it could incorporate into social welfare profiles 
individual normative claims relating to fairness, equality, or freedom. 
In this spirit, Richard Epstein has proposed a hybrid form of 
utilitarianism based on a “congruence” he sees “between natural law 
and utilitarian theories on some of the key building blocks of our own 
legal tradition,” including property rights.380 Some have wondered 
whether Epstein’s account hangs together as a consequentialist 
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theory.381 Because productive labor theory justifies property rights 
and the public good in relation to interests in rational flourishing,382 it 
may supply the reconciliation Epstein hopes to attain. 
One way or another, productive labor theory may be able to give 
an account of the reasons why economic defenses of property rights 
have the sort of value justifying enforcing property in law. Labor 
facilitates a form of preference-satisfaction within broad but firm 
outer boundaries. As explained, in ordinary situations people should 
have freedom to use resources for survival and their own reasonable 
life goals.383 To the extent that people have preferences to acquire 
property for these varied ends, their preferences deserve respect and 
satisfaction. But productive labor theory imputes to citizens a “tacit 
and voluntary consent” not to have other preferences: to enslave or 
get priority over neighbors; to deploy resources idly or destructively; 
to claim shares of resources inconsiderate of the just sufficiency and 
necessity claims of others; or to take satisfaction from the legal 
regime’s choking the productive use of resources.384 
Similarly, productive labor theory facilitates a form of wealth 
maximization. Although in principle it is “entirely a contingent 
matter” whether “accumulation or industry are rational,” in practice 
“by and large they are rational.”385 When a society creates new homes, 
medicine, food, and life conveniences, it expands the range of things 
with “usefulness to the Life of Man.”386 And when a society institutes 
money and financial instruments, these instruments have moral value 
insofar as they give people durable and respected mechanisms for 
banking the potential to acquire things useful for their reasonable life 
goals. 
F. Illustrations 
1.  Exclusive Property 
This moral background supplies the premises needed to 
strengthen economic justifications for exclusive property. When 
exclusive property is said to generate “wealth,” that statement makes 
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moral sense if it is understood as coarse and compressed shorthand 
for a moral claim. As Part IV showed, exclusive property can, in 
combination with contract and money, “over-ballance the 
Community” of resources, by increasing the store “of things really 
useful to the Life of Man	.	.	.	.”387 The moral claim makes clear, 
however, commonly overlooked moral limits on “wealth-creation” or 
“wealth-maximization.”388 As Part V showed, the fruits of increased 
productivity need to be distributed consistent with the sufficiency 
proviso, but when that constraint is satisfied property’s wealth-
creating tendencies justify it. Similarly, exclusive property can 
maximize the protection of subjective value—as long as “subjective 
value” is understood to encompass activity consistent with the 
sociable pursuit of survival or rational improvement, and not 
destructive, idle, or selfish valuations on things.389 And “information 
cost” minimization is relevant to property as well, as long as 
information costs are understood as a compressed shorthand for the 
claim-marking element, and suitably qualified for the sufficiency and 
necessity claims of non-owners.390 
So understood, productive labor theory also helps economic 
analyses deal with hard preferences, like the preferences recounted of 
aboriginals, communitarians, or antiproperty romantics.391 Citizens 
like these are entitled to their preferences for their own ways of life. 
They deserve equal opportunities to acquire property and manage the 
property they acquire as common land for their own members. They 
may not leverage their preferences into super-preferences, however, 
so that the entire community’s system is structured to force or 
incentivize other citizens to conform to their preferred methods of 
living. The rest of the community has legitimate authority to disregard 
those last preferences on the ground that they restrict free labor and 
deny the rights of the rest of the citizenry. 
2.  Property Reassemblies 
Similar arguments supply premises missing from economic 
justifications for programs limiting exclusive property rights; again, 
reassembly schemes illustrate this issue. Wealth enlargement and 
maximization are much more defensible if understood as coarse and 
compressed shorthand for a moral goal—increasing the opportunities 
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for all to acquire conveniences of life and labor productively. Some 
American nuisance decisions have appealed to this principle, 
especially undue hardship cases in which a court-ordered injunction 
would shut down a town company.392 And some earlier public use and 
police power decisions appealed to this principle as well, in cases 
approving reclamation of swamp drainage projects and reassemblies 
of land for irrigation projects and power mills.393 For example, one 
leading U.S. Supreme Court case upheld a state law authorizing the 
reorganization of land for power mills on this ground: 
When property, in which several persons have a common 
interest, cannot be fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing 
condition, the law often provides a way in which they may 
compel one another to submit to measures necessary to secure 
its beneficial enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any 
whose control of or interest in the property is thereby 
modified.394 
Of course, the standards assumed in this passage are less 
determinate than a standard like wealth-maximization. Yet those 
standards are less determinate because they recognize important 
moral limitations that are either assumed or disregarded by the 
concept of wealth-maximization. If a reconfiguration of property 
increases net wealth, that increase is helpful, but by no means 
sufficient to justify the reconfiguration. Because any reconfiguration 
disrupts conventional property rights, it bears a burden of satisfying 
 
 392. To explain how it would consider the relevant equities in the nuisance suit by 
landowners against two nearby copper refineries, the court reasoned,  
[I]n a case of conflicting rights, where neither party can enjoy his own without in 
some measure restricting the liberty of the other in the use of property, the law 
must make the best arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a 
view to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty possible under the 
circumstances.  
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 667 (Tenn. 1904). 
 393. See, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 157–64 (1896) 
(upholding an irrigation project both on public use and reciprocity of advantage grounds); 
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606, 614 (1885) (upholding a state law authorizing state 
geology surveyors to drain swamps and to assess affected owners for the expenses, as a 
police regulation improving land); Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 704 
(1884) (declaring it “not open to doubt that it is in the power of the state to require local 
improvements to be made which are essential to the health and prosperity of any 
community[,]” and upholding a swamp reclamation project on this basis); Fiske v. 
Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68, 72–73 (1831) (upholding a mill act on the 
ground that it facilitates the beneficial use of water courses, on condition that the act be 
construed not to preempt other riparians’ common law actions for flooding). 
 394. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 21 (1885). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 413 (2017) 
490 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
rights-based deontological limitations.395 Those limitations are easy to 
satisfy when owners are making little or no beneficial use of the 
property needed for reassembly—say, arid land that has not been 
developed because it is not yet irrigated. The same limitations may 
also be satisfied when it is practically impossible to generate a new 
and more productive activity without reassembly. The Supreme 
Court’s holding above captures that concern in power mill litigation—
especially in its statement that the mill “cannot be fully and 
beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition.”396 In those latter cases 
though, the government must not only certify that reassembly is 
strictly necessary, but also ensure through generous compensation 
that the ousted owners benefit from the reconfiguration. In the 
passage just quoted, not “just” compensation but “equitable 
compensation.”397 
In short, although the foregoing criteria do take wealth 
enlargement into account, they do so only as part of a more complex 
moral calculus about how to enlarge opportunities to acquire and use 
resources while respecting the freedom and the flourishing interests 
of current owners. That same moral background fills in the context 
lacking from terms like “subjective value” and “hold out.” These 
terms make it sound as if regulators can decide which reassemblies to 
authorize using a simple subtraction formula. The regulators should 
authorize a project if all of its social benefits from a project are 
greater than its subjective-value losses. Before conducting this 
analysis, regulators should make sure that project opponents are 
opposing the project sincerely and not holding out. This approach is 
far more justifiable if “subjective values” and “hold-outs” are 
understood in moral terms. 
Imagine that a new power mill could not be built without ousting 
a riparian. Imagine also that the riparian objected—not because he 
was greedy, but because he opposed the mill for the same ideological, 
“don’t tread on me,” class-based reasons that motivated Suzette Kelo 
to object to eminent domain in her New London neighborhood.398 A 
conscientious official could reasonably treat Kelo and the riparian 
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differently. The official could classify Kelo as a “sincere dissenter” 
protecting “subjective value” and the riparian as a “hold out.” Yet the 
distinction between Kelo and the imagined riparian has nothing to do 
with their actual motivations or preferences—by assumption, the 
motivations and preferences are identical. Rather, the hypothetical 
riparian would be a “holdout” even if she were not trying to 
expropriate wealth from the mill company, because, in context, her 
intentions and her rights claims would be extreme. It would not 
matter how sincerely she opposed the mill. If a reasonable and social 
onlooker were to agree that there was no means short of 
condemnation to create the mill, that the community stood to benefit 
from the mill, and that the authorities were taking every reasonable 
step to protect the flourishing interests beneath her property rights, 
the riparian would be a “holdout” simply by virtue of objecting to a 
project increasing opportunities throughout the community. By 
contrast, Kelo could still be a “sincere dissenter” protecting 
“subjective value” because she is asserting her rights in a context in 
which a reasonable and sociable onlooker would conclude that 
condemnation is not so strictly necessary that it justifies overriding 
the ordinary presumption that owners should be free to use their own 
lots for their own goals. Here, productive labor theory again 
complements economic accounts of land assembly by supplying moral 
assumptions under which economic analyses could be politically 
legitimate. 
CONCLUSION 
In his contribution to the 2009 Symposium on Progressive 
Property, Gregory Alexander concluded, “American property law is 
not solely about either individual freedom or cost-minimization.”399 
Productive labor theory confirms as much. But it provides an 
alternative considerably different from the understandings of 
freedom, cost-minimization, and progressive values on display in 
current scholarship. 
Productive labor theory supplies a rights-based theory of 
property that does not receive adequate appreciation. Productive 
labor theory presents not a theory of autonomy but of liberty ordered 
to facilitate flourishing. Flourishing, productive labor, sufficiency, 
sociability, and equal opportunity supply a normative framework for 
reasoning about exclusive rights and use-based needs, and this 
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framework puts cost-minimization and other consequentialist 
concerns in their proper contexts. 
This justification supplies property with a normative foundation 
more satisfying than it currently has. To exclusion theorists, 
productive labor theory provides a friendly reminder of the questions 
that still need to be answered about the link between efficiency and 
property law—but it also supplies answers to those questions. To 
progressive theorists, productive labor theory offers a friendly 
warning: flourishing can work not only to justify property, but also to 
destabilize it and encourage aggressive political infighting around it. 
Here too, productive labor theory offers a solution: progressives may 
be able to agree that property consists of a general and indirect right 
of exclusive control, which may be limited when strong flourishing-
based interests so suggest. 
Productive labor theory will not answer every question about 
property law. Yet it is instructive that an old account of property 
manages to be both durable and relevant to contemporary scholars’ 
questions. And maybe that account can keep property on sturdier 
foundations than those on which it has rested in recent scholarship. 
